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Some academics and politicians have proposed that taxpayers should be
reimbursed for costs of randomly imposed tax audits, because, they argue,
randomly imposing audit costs is unfair. But none of those proposing audit
compensation have explained why randomly imposed audit costs are unfair, or
why, if these randomly imposed costs are unfair, this unfairness necessarily means
that taxpayers should be compensated. These are important questions because
explicit randomness is an essential tool for tax enforcement, and for other areas of
law, but its use may be limited if randomness is equated with unfairness.
The Article argues that it is fair not to compensate randomly audited
taxpayers for their audit costs, because the availability of insurance against
random audit costs cures fairness concerns under luck egalitarianism. Fairness
may nonetheless matter for a less obvious reason: notwithstanding philosophical
arguments to the contrary, individuals may perceive random audits as unfair.
Empirical work has shown that individuals have a taste for fairness in tax law, and
that the perception that tax law is unfair may reduce tax compliance. Therefore,
perceived unfairness should be of concern to welfarists, among others.
Based on a comparison of random audits with other burdens randomly
imposed by the government, the Article concludes that perceived unfairness may
warrant nominal compensation for random audit costs. The costs of the perceived
unfairness of random audits, as opposed to other types of randomly imposed
burdens, may be particularly high because of general ignorance about, and
negative perceptions of, our tax system. Compensation for random audit costs is
therefore warranted not because it is actually unfair to impose audit costs
randomly, but rather because such compensation may help to overcome
perceptions of unfairness and thus to increase overall tax compliance.
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Fairly Random:
On Compensating Audited Taxpayers
SARAH B. LAWSKY 
I. INTRODUCTION
Randomness is underrated. Explicit randomness is an essential tool in
tax enforcement, as it is in other areas of law, but its usefulness may be
limited if this randomness is, or is perceived as, unfair. This Article
therefore focuses on one way that the tax system currently employs explicit
randomness and evaluates the claim that this explicit randomness unfairly
allocates costs among taxpayers.
Some academics and politicians have proposed that taxpayers should
be reimbursed for the costs of purely random audits.1 As part of this
argument for compensation, the claim is often made that randomly
imposed audit costs are unfair, and that this unfairness is relevant to
whether taxpayers should be compensated for audit costs.2 However, none
of those proposing audit compensation have explained why randomly
imposed audit costs are unfair, or why, if these randomly imposed costs are
unfair, this unfairness necessarily means that taxpayers should be
compensated. In contrast, this Article directly addresses the questions of
fairness that underlie proposals to compensate taxpayers who are randomly
selected for audit, and concludes that it is generally fair to impose audit

Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Thanks to Lily
Batchelder, Joshua Blank, Noel Cunningham, Elizabeth Emens, Brian Galle, Ellen Lawsky, Jeffrey
Lax, Karen Olsson, Deborah Schenk, Daniel Shaviro, Geoffrey Stone, Cass Sunstein, Joshua Tate,
David Weisbach, and Ethan Yale for helpful discussions and for comments on earlier drafts.
1
See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax Shelters, The Cash Economy, and
Compliance Costs, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005) (proposing compensating taxpayers for random
audit costs); Joseph Bankman, Who Should Bear Tax Compliance Costs? (Stanford Law Sch., John M.
Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 279, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=519783 [hereinafter Bankman, Who Should Bear Tax Compliance Costs?]
(proposing compensating taxpayers for random audit costs); Ryan J. Donmoyer, Citing Budget
Uncertainties, IRS Delays TCMP Start Until December, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 178-1, Sept. 12, 1995,
available at LEXIS, News Library, TNT File (quoting Representative Nancy Johnson as proposing
compensation for audit costs); George Guttman, The Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program: Is
It Necessary?, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 109-11, June 6, 1995, available at LEXIS, News Library, TNT
File (“Some have proposed reimbursing taxpayers for the added burdens brought by a TCMP audit . . .
.”); David L. Keating, National Taxpayers Union Foundation’s Testimony at W&M Oversight Hearing
on TCMP, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 140-46, July 19, 1995, available at LEXIS, News Library, TNT File
(proposing compensating taxpayers for random audit costs); Warren Rojas, Information Gap Bars
Compliance Compensation, Treasury Officials Say, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 24-4, Feb. 5, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News Library, TNT File (discussing Professor Bankman’s proposal); see also
discussion infra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
2
Compare infra Part II.B, with infra note 179.
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costs randomly without compensation.
Notwithstanding this fairness, however, people may still perceive
random, uncompensated audits as unfair. Because people have a taste for
fairness in tax law, and because compliance may be reduced if people
perceive tax law as unfair, this perceived unfairness should be of concern
to welfarists and others who seek to increase overall social welfare.
Part II first explains why random audits are crucial to effective
enforcement and then describes the claim that random audits are unfair and
that to mitigate this unfairness, taxpayers should be compensated for the
costs imposed by random audits.3 Part III argues that randomly imposing
audit costs, and not compensating taxpayers for these costs, is in fact fair in
general, though there may be some exceptions to this general rule,
particularly as it applies to low-income taxpayers.4 Part IV describes
welfarism and explains why perceived unfairness of random audits should
matter to welfarists.5 Part V compares random audits with other burdens
the government randomly imposes on individuals to get a sense of whether
random audit costs involve the type of unfairness that should be remedied
by compensation. 6 Based on this comparison, the Article tentatively
resolves that perceived unfairness may warrant some compensation for
random audit costs.7 This compensation is desirable not because
randomness itself is unfair, but rather because people do not understand
how audit selection works and have generally negative perceptions of our
tax system. Part VI concludes. 8
II. RANDOM AUDITS
A. The Value of Random Audits
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) selects very few returns for audit
randomly, but random audits are crucial to effective enforcement of tax
laws. This Part explains the three ways the IRS selects individuals’ tax
returns for audit,9 and the role that randomness plays in that selection and
in other areas of tax enforcement and compliance.
1. IRS Projects and Automatic Audits
The IRS examines returns with “certain features” individually to

3

See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.
See infra Part III.
5
See infra Part IV.
6
See infra Part V.
7
See infra Part V.
8
See infra Part VI.
9
Methods for selecting individuals’ returns for audit differ from methods used to select other
types of returns for audit.
4
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determine whether they should be audited. For example, the IRS may
audit individuals whose returns were prepared by someone whom the IRS
has identified as “questionable”; individuals whose returns involve illegal
income; returns that are referred to the IRS by, for example, state tax
agencies; or returns that are picked out because of particular “IRS
projects.”11 Previous IRS projects have studied, among other groups,
taxpayers who claimed the earned income tax credit; taxpayers who
claimed exemptions for dependents who also appeared on other returns;
individuals who operated certain types of bars and restaurants in Ohio;
individuals in Illinois who filed dubious information regarding profits and
losses from their sole proprietorships; individuals who claimed business
losses that they did not actually incur so that they would qualify for the
earned income tax credit; and certain individuals in Missouri who had
failed to pay self-employment tax.12 Other “automatic audits” include
audits of returns involving narcotics money or known tax shelters.13 The
IRS selects these special projects or automatic audits because it already has
reason to believe that these groups tend to underpay taxes, and therefore a
high percentage of these audits result in additional tax revenue. 14
2. Statistical Selection
The IRS selects some returns for audit based on statistical profiling.
The IRS screens all individual returns with a computer program that
analyzes a return’s basic characteristics to determine the probability that
auditing the return will result in an upward adjustment.15 Different return
characteristics are weighted, and then the weights are added together to
arrive at a numerical score.16 The computer program that performs this
screening applies what is known as the “Discriminant Index Function,” or
“DIF,” and thus a return’s score is its “DIF score.” The DIF appears to be
an effective method for selecting returns to audit because it permits the IRS
to focus its audits on returns that are more likely to yield additional tax
revenue. In 1968, the DIF did not yet exist, and forty-three percent of
audited returns resulted in no change. 17 That is, forty-three percent of
audited returns provided no additional tax revenue.18 In 1994, returns
10

INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.19.11.1.5 (2007).
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS’ RETURN SELECTION PROCESS 4–
5 (1999) [hereinafter IRS’ RETURN SELECTION PROCESS].
12
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS’ USE OF RANDOM SELECTION IN
CHOOSING TAX RETURNS FOR AUDIT 24 (1998) [hereinafter IRS’ USE OF RANDOM SELECTION].
13
IRS’ RETURN SELECTION PROCESS, supra note 11, at 5.
14
For example, from 1992 to 1994, only nineteen percent of books and records returns selected
due to IRS projects were closed with no change to the amount of tax due. Id.
15
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.19.11.1.4 (2007).
16
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.19.11.1.5.1 (2007).
17
George Guttman, News Analysis—Who Should the IRS Be Auditing?, 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY
49-4, Mar. 13, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, TNT File.
18
Id.
11
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selected for audit based on DIF scores had only a nineteen percent nochange rate—that is, only nineteen percent of returns selected for audit
using the DIF provided no additional tax revenue. 19
The portion of audited returns selected for audit using the DIF varies
widely from year to year, depending on the IRS’s priorities in a given
year,20 but the DIF remains crucial to the IRS’s enforcement efforts.
Overall, between 1992 and 1994, inclusive, DIF scores were used to select
fifty-nine percent of the returns subject to “books and records” audits, that
is, audits that could not be resolved simply by correspondence, 21 but rather
involved the government’s having to meet the taxpayer face-to-face and
review his books and records.22
3. Random Selection
Finally, a tiny fraction of returns is selected for audit at random.
Generating revenue is not the direct purpose of these audits. Rather,
random audits are used primarily to gather information.23 The information
gathered is used to create and update the DIF which, as described above,
permits the IRS to use its limited audit resources more effectively; to
determine whether IRS approaches to encouraging compliance, such as
improved guidance for taxpayers, are effective; and to estimate the total
gap between tax revenue that should have been collected and tax revenue
actually collected (commonly known as the “tax gap”).24
These information-gathering random audits began, under the name
“Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program,” or “TCMP,” in the 1960s,
and were repeated every three years until 1988. Each TCMP audit
examined a relatively small number—less than 100,000—of randomly
selected returns of individuals. A TCMP audit took about twice as long as
a regular audit, and involved not only a line-by-line review of each
19

Id.
For example, in 1992, the IRS selected between fifty-five percent and fifty-nine percent of
individual returns audited using the DIF. Id. (“The DIF rate for individual returns in 1992 was 59
percent, according to the IRS.”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE , TAX ADMINISTRATION:
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES TO OBTAIN COMPLIANCE DATA 6 (1996) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE
STRATEGIES] (stating that the DIF rate in 1992 was “over 55 percent” of individual returns). In 1994,
because the IRS chose to use its resources on a project targeting nonfilers, only twenty-one percent of
individual returns audited were selected using the DIF. See Guttman, supra note 17 (attributing the
drop in audited individual returns in 1993 and 1994 to a nonfiler initiative).
21
Correspondence audits rely solely on written correspondence between the IRS and the taxpayer.
These audits are limited to situations in which all information required to resolve the audit can be
“easily submitted by mail.” INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.19.11.1.3(9) (2007). Issues that might
be resolved through a correspondence audit include verification of medical and dental expenses or
other easy-to-verify deductions such as real estate or state taxes paid. Id.
22
IRS’ RETURN SELECTION PROCESS, supra note 11, at 3.
23
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 20, at 2.
24
Id. (describing the purposes of TCMP audits); IRS, Privacy Impact Assessment—National
Research Program, http://www.irs.gov/privacy/article/0,,id=139179,00.html (describing the purpose of
NRP audits, which is the same as the purpose of TCMP audits) (last visited July 10, 2008).
20
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taxpayer’s return, but also substantiation for all the information on the
taxpayer’s return.25 Another TCMP was scheduled for the 1994 tax year,
but the study was postponed in response to anti-IRS political pressure, and
then was cancelled in 1995 after Congress significantly reduced the IRS
budget.26 In 2002, the IRS began its National Research Program, or
“NRP.” Like the TCMP, the NRP selects returns randomly, but it reviews
even fewer returns and does so with less intensity than the TCMP.27 A
new NRP compliance study began in October 2007.28
Although relatively few taxpayers are selected for random audits,
random audits are key to IRS enforcement. The importance of these audits
lies in their very randomness, because it is this randomness that permits the
IRS to gather accurate information. Indeed, one statistician has described
these random audits as “an irreplaceable technique for understanding a
whole host of economic and tax compliance issues.”29 Because the audits
that gather information for the DIF are random, the DIF can be structured
to pick out returns to audit that have a higher probability of resulting in a
significant tax change. 30 This selection can be performed without
distorting future audits, because enforcement results are not used to change
the DIF; rather, only data gathered from the random audits move the DIF. 31
25
See Press Release, IRS, IRS Moves to Ensure Fairness of Tax System; Research Program
Works to Increase Compliance Program Effectiveness, Reduce Burdens on Taxpayers (Jan. 16, 2002),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-02-05.pdf [hereinafter Press Release, IRS Moves to
Ensure Fairness] (explaining that the IRS is moving away from the time-intensive audits and putting
the burden on itself).
26
The study would have reviewed over 150,000 individual returns. George Guttman, Citing
Budget, IRS Announces Indefinite Suspension of TCMP, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 212-25, Oct. 30, 1995,
available at LEXIS, News Library, TNT File. For example, Newt Gingrich, House Speaker at the
time, referred to the TCMP as “a little bit like the return of the Inquisition,” and said that it was used by
the IRS simply to persecute randomly selected taxpayers. Id.; see also infra text accompanying note
106 (discussing the effect on compliance of perceived retributive injustice).
27
Under the NRP, the IRS audited about 46,000 individual tax returns from the 2001 tax year,
completing the audits in 2005. Press Release, IRS, IRS Updates Tax Gap Estimates (Feb. 14, 2006),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-06-028.pdf. The majority of those audits involved a
“focus only on select parts of approximately 30,000 returns,” and only “about 2,000 audits” were lineby-line audits. Press Release, IRS Moves to Ensure Fairness, supra note 25. Furthermore, an NRP
audit, unlike a TCMP audit, does not require substantiation for each line of a tax return, even in the
line-by-line audits. Id.
28
Unlike the prior surveys, the new NRP is multi-year, and will examine about 13,000 individual
tax returns for each taxable year, starting with returns for the 2006 taxable year. Press Release, I.R.S.
Media Relations Office, IRS Updates National Research Program for Individuals (June 6, 2007),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-07-113.pdf. While most individuals selected for the
NRP will have in-person meetings with IRS auditors to confirm specific lines of their returns,
individuals whose returns can be fully verified via third-party reporting and matching will not even be
contacted by the IRS, and may not even know they were part of the NRP. Id.
29
Fritz Scheuren, GWU Professor’s Testimony at W&M Oversight Hearing on TCMP, 95 TAX
NOTES TODAY 140-47, July 19, 1995, available at LEXIS, News Library, TNT File.
30
This assumes the sample of taxpayers is sufficiently large and is well designed, which appears
to be at least roughly the case; one statistician who helped design the TCMP believes that the sample
design work is of “an exceedingly high calibre.” Id.
31
Cf. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN
AN ACTUARIAL AGE 145–72 (2007) (describing how adjusting enforcement programs based on non-
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Additionally, random audits allow the IRS to avoid channeling its
enforcement resources based entirely on its preconceptions.32 In short,
while relatively few taxpayers are picked for audit randomly, random
audits provide information that is essential to tax enforcement.
B. The Compensation Proposal: Begging the Unfairness Question
During Congress’s anti-IRS campaign of the 1990s, random audits
came under attack. Prominent politicians and lobbyists claimed that
subjecting a random group of taxpayers to such a costly process was
unfair. Senator Mike Enzi referred to random audits as an “abomination”
and said that random audits were not legitimate.33 Senator Paul Coverdell
proposed banning random audits because they were unfair.34 And the
president of the National Taxpayers Union stated before the Ways and
Means Oversight Committee that it was “patently unfair to put a random
group of taxpayers through the rigorous, sometimes ridiculous and very
expensive process that TCMP entails for statistical purposes.”35
In response to the claim that imposing these costs randomly is unfair,
some have suggested that taxpayers who are selected for these random
audits should be financially compensated for their audit costs.36 For
example, Representative Nancy Johnson said that such taxpayers should be
reimbursed for their troubles in part because, as she explained, “the audits
are seen as unfair for those whose returns show no indication of a need for
an audit.”37 Similarly, from the academic side, Joseph Bankman has
argued that randomly imposed audits provide “probably the strongest case
for government reimbursement of compliance costs” because such audits
are thought to be “unfair and/or politically unsustainable . . . . A generous
reimbursement system . . . might resolve the fairness and political issues
that have dogged that program.”38 He argues that random audits “unfairly
random sampling can lead to a “ratchet effect” in which profiled characteristics increasingly define the
offending group); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Shaping of Chance: Actuarial Models and Criminal
Profiling at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 105, 124–25 (2003) (same).
32
See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 1 (“Malcolm Sparrow, an IRS consultant and expert on
compliance matters with Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, argues that TCMP is vital
because it can detect patterns of noncompliance that the Service might otherwise not notice. According
to Sparrow, the strength of TCMP is in its random selection.”).
33
Senators Blast IRS, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 89-86, May 8, 1998, available at LEXIS, News
Library, TNT File (reprinting Senator Mike Enzi’s remarks on the Senate floor).
34
144 CONG. REC. S3791 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1998) (introducing the Internal Revenue Service
Random Audit Prohibition Act).
35
Keating, supra note 1.
36
See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 1 (“Some have proposed reimbursing taxpayers for the added
burdens brought by a TCMP audit.”); Keating, supra note 1 (“[T]he government should be required to
compensate . . . taxpayers.”).
37
Donmoyer, supra note 1 (quoting Representative Johnson).
38
Bankman, Who Should Bear Tax Compliance Costs?, supra note 1, at 3; see also id. (“[S]ome
compliance costs fall disproportionally upon a small group of taxpayers. A rule that shifted these costs
to the government might comport with some notions of fairness.”); id. at 17 (“The costs of running a
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concentrate costs on a small handful of taxpayers, who were randomly
chosen to perform a subsidized public service for other taxpayers.”39
Although it is difficult to quantify the costs that random audits, like all
audits, impose on taxpayers,40 there are at least three kinds of costs a
taxpayer might bear due to an audit, random or otherwise: direct financial
costs, opportunity costs, and emotional costs. First, audits may directly
cost a taxpayer, even an honest taxpayer, money—that is, the taxpayer may
have to expend money, as distinguished from using time for the audit that
he otherwise would have used to earn money. As a result, the taxpayer
may wish to retain an accountant to help him make sense of his finances,
or a lawyer or other agent to represent him before the IRS.41
Second, audits may cost a taxpayer time because he may have to gather
and review documents for an auditor, or sit with an auditor while the
auditor reviews documents and questions the taxpayer. This is likely time
the taxpayer would prefer to spend on another activity, or time the taxpayer
could have spent earning money.
Finally, even a taxpayer who believes that he has fully complied with
the tax law may suffer emotional distress because of the audit. Perhaps he
fears that even though he has done nothing wrong, the IRS will make a
mistake and demand more money from him; perhaps he is disturbed by the
government’s searching through his financial records, or by the presence of
a representative of the government in his home; perhaps he feels ashamed
that he is being audited; or perhaps he suffers emotional distress from the
audit for some other reason personal to that taxpayer.
Compensating taxpayers for their audit costs might have advantages.
For example, forcing the government to internalize more compliance costs
might cause the government to create more efficient rules and procedures
and to calibrate marginal costs and benefits more accurately.42 The
reimbursement program include the costs of reimbursement and the costs of administering the program.
Both costs would presumably be funded through a . . . conventional income tax. This might be fairer
than the . . . present system, which, as noted above, is to some extent haphazard in its incidence.”); id.
at 23 (“[T]he existing [audit cost] burden acts as an unfairly levied de facto penalty.”).
39
Id. at 6.
40
The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 required the IRS to quantify pre- and postfiling burdens, but the IRS has not yet managed to provide any numbers for post-filing burdens. As of
May 2000, the IRS had not designed a model to determine post-filing burdens, and in fact did not even
have the data that would permit it to design such a model. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., TAX
ADMINISTRATION: IRS IS WORKING TO IMPROVE ITS ESTIMATES OF COMPLIANCE BURDEN 13 (2000)
(reporting that, in 2000, decisions still needed to be made regarding the model). As of February 2004,
the IRS apparently still had made no headway on the project. Rojas, supra note 1 (referring to pre- and
post-filing burdens as a future tool). I have been able to locate no mention since then of such a project.
41
One medium-sized accounting firm has estimated that it would charge a high-income taxpayer
in the New York City area who was selected for a random audit “[a]nywhere from $2,500 to $25,000”
for audit-related representation. Tom Herman, The Next Audit Scare, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2007, at
D1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (quoting David Lifson, Partner, Hays & Co.).
42
E.g., D AVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL 316–17 (2003) (suggesting that “[t]o protect
taxpayers from zealous IRS agents,” a taxpayer who is audited should “get a payment from the
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proposal also has drawbacks, or at least potential difficulties. For example,
if only honest taxpayers were compensated for audit costs, the IRS would
have an even greater incentive to find something wrong on every return it
examined. 43 On the other hand, compensating all taxpayers for the costs of
randomly imposed audits would weaken any deterrence that penalties
currently provide and thus might lessen tax compliance.44
If taxpayers should be compensated for randomly imposed audit costs,
all these difficulties, and others, would have to be addressed. But before
we reach these questions, which are essentially questions of
implementation, more fundamental issues must be addressed. In particular,
the compensation proposal, to the extent it is motivated by the desire to
mitigate unfairness, begs some basic questions: are randomly imposed
audit costs in fact unfair? And if randomly imposed audit costs are unfair,
should financial compensation be used to mitigate this unfairness? This
Article answers these questions.
III. ARE UNCOMPENSATED RANDOM AUDIT COSTS UNFAIR?
This Part examines fairness from an ex ante and ex post perspective.
From a pure ex ante perspective, randomly imposing audit costs and not
compensating taxpayers for these costs is fair. From an ex post
perspective, such random costs at first appear unfair. This Part argues,
however, that because taxpayers may choose to buy insurance against ex
post inequality, randomly imposing audit costs, and not compensating
individuals for these costs, is also fair from an ex post perspective. 45

government, say $100, for her trouble if her tax return was flawless, and a 10 percent bonus on any
additional refund”); Bankman, Who Should Bear Tax Compliance Costs?, supra note 1, at 13 (“A rule
that reimburses taxpayers for compliance costs will avoid the externalization of costs by the
government to taxpayers but lead to externalization of taxpayer costs to the government. The
government will have an incentive to minimize costs within its control.”). Senator Phil Gramm said
that he “think[s] [compensating taxpayers for random audits] will be a check on the IRS in terms of
when to cut bait on some of these lawsuits, if, in fact, you force [the IRS] to pay the cost.” Full Text:
Unofficial Transcript of Finance Committee Hearing on IRS Reform, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 25-31,
Feb. 6, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, TNT File; see also Keating, supra note 1 (arguing for
compensating taxpayers for TCMP costs because under the current system, “the IRS has little incentive
to make the process more efficient because it has ignored the value of taxpayers’ time and expense”).
43
See, e.g., Keating, supra note 1 (“While some may argue that taxpayers whose exams render a
sizable deficiency and substantial non-compliance should bear the cost of their examinations, this will
only serve to encourage some at the IRS to assume overly aggressive positions with respect to potential
adjustments.”). This problem might be addressed by having a sliding scale for reimbursement, or
requiring the IRS to pay out a certain amount of compliance compensation each audit cycle. Bankman,
Who Should Bear Tax Compliance Costs?, supra note 1, at 22–23.
44
See, e.g., Bankman, Who Should Bear Tax Compliance Costs?, supra note 1, at 22 (“It might
[seem] inapposite to reimburse compliance costs for those who seem likely to, and in fact do,
underreport their income taxes.”).
45
Even those who believe overall welfare is an important evaluative principle may accept that
fairness could be independently relevant. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 52–61 (2006) (advocating as a decision principle “weak
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A. What Is Fair?
What does it mean to claim that it is actually unfair to impose audit
costs randomly and not to compensate audited taxpayers for these costs—
that is, to impose costs randomly on certain citizens for the good of the
whole?46 In other words, what does “fairness” mean in this context?
We could view the process of allocating random audits as a process for
randomly selecting individuals to escape audit. In other words, if audits
are required in order to enforce tax law effectively, “not being audited” can
be seen as a scarce good that must be allocated among taxpayers. That is,
there is not enough “nonauditing” to go around, because some people must
be audited. 47 All taxpayers are in the same position ex ante—everyone can
expect to bear the same audit cost, weighted by the probability of audit—
but those selected for audit end up, ex post, worse off than those not
selected.48
Viewed from a pure ex ante perspective, randomly distributing audit
costs is fair. When audits, and thus audit costs, are imposed randomly, all
taxpayers have an equal chance of being selected for audit, and the
individual qualities of each taxpayer are irrelevant. In other words, such an
audit lottery is equiprobable and impersonal, 49 and treats all taxpayers as
equals. 50 Moreover, no other mechanism (such as adjudication) is
available; as discussed above, given the government’s limited resources,
which make auditing everyone impossible, some audits must be imposed
randomly if tax enforcement is to be effective.51
Under these
welfarism,” which takes as relevant some set of considerations {W, F1, F2 . . . Fm}, where W is overall
welfare and the set of Fi are other considerations, which “might include an egalitarian factor”).
46
Nonrandom audits also raise their own questions of fairness—questions outside the scope of
this Article. For example, is it unfair to impose costs on certain citizens for the good of the whole
because they have certain characteristics that suggest, based on statistical models, that they are more
likely than the general population to have disobeyed the law (i.e., to use DIF scores to select
individuals for audit)? And is it unfair to impose costs on certain citizens for the good of the whole
because they have one characteristic that may or may not suggest that they are more likely than the
general population to have disobeyed the law (i.e., to audit an individual as part of an IRS special
project)?
47
Recall that while the government is imposing costs on some, but not all, taxpayers, the costs are
not punitive—that is, the costs are not intended to punish. The government does not assume
culpability. The truly random audits, in particular, do not even have raising revenue or enforcement as
their immediate purpose. Indeed, some have suggested that individuals who are picked randomly to be
audited as part of TCMP (now NRP) audits should not be subject to any upward adjustment of their
taxes, regardless of what the audit reveals. Rather, as discussed supra in notes 23–32 and
accompanying text, random audits are primarily information-gathering projects that permit the IRS to
develop the DIF score, which in turn permits the IRS to (try to) focus its audit resources on individuals
who are more likely to have failed to comply with the tax law.
48
See Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 124 (2003) (noting
both welfarists and egalitarians may be committed to a strong ex ante justice position).
49
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 SOC. SCI. INFO. 483, 485 (1988)
(explaining that a fair lottery is inherently defined by its “equiprobability” and “impersonality”).
50
See id. at 502 (noting that a fair lottery “is indifferent and hence neutral among the members of
the lottery pool”).
51
See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
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circumstances, if our commitment is to treating taxpayers as equals ex
ante, random audits are both fair and just.52
It may initially seem that from an ex post perspective, randomly
imposed audits are unfair because they impose burdens on some people,
but not others, for no reason. The government, in other words, is not
treating “likes alike.” Some people must bear the burden of audit costs;
others escape those costs; and there is no principled way to distinguish
among these people. This seems, in a general sense, unfair.
But ex ante and ex post concerns can be blended by linking outcomes
with the ability to avoid these outcomes. Some philosophers, called luck
egalitarians, have argued that individuals should bear the consequences of
risk unless that risk was unavoidable. 53 If an individual is personally
responsible for putting himself in the risky position, then he should bear
any negative outcome of the risk. This is Ronald Dworkin’s “option
luck”—luck related to “deliberate and calculated gambles.” If, on the other
hand, he could not avoid the risk, then it is fair to compensate him. 54 This
is “brute luck”—such as being “hit by a falling meteorite.”55 In other
words, a person should bear the consequences of his choices, and thus
should not be compensated for bad option luck, but should be compensated
for bad brute luck, which is not the result of any choice he made.
Essentially, if unavoidable risk harms some, but not all, individuals, those
who are harmed should be compensated.
Being randomly selected for a tax audit is more an effect of brute luck
than of option luck. Most taxpayers who earn enough money to support

52

See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 49, at 510 (“Lotteries . . . [do] justice among equally
entitled claimants.”). Randomness has been proposed as a useful decision process in other areas
because it treats all parties the same ex ante and thus is more fair than other available methods of
decisionmaking. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Heads or Tails? A Modest Proposal for Deciding Close
Elections, 39 CONN. L. REV. 739, 741–42 (2006) (proposing that close elections be decided randomly,
because a coin flip would seem more fair than permitting judges or other public officials to decide close
elections); Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283
(1984) (proposing a method of election in which, instead of electing the candidate who receives the
most votes, a “single ballot is randomly drawn [from the pool of all ballots cast], and the candidate
chosen in that ballot wins the election”). Intriguingly, these “proposals” are generally not meant
seriously, and are disclaimed by their authors as “modest proposal[s],” Pitts, supra, 742, 755, or
“thought experiment[s],” Amar, supra, at 1283.
53
For scholarship that uses egalitarianism to analyze tax policy, see generally Anne L. Alstott,
Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469, 476–85 (2007) (discussing
Ronald Dworkin’s equality of resources approach); Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal
Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967 (1999) (questioning employment subsidies in
an egalitarian framework); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104
YALE L.J. 283 (1994) (arguing for comprehensive tax reform); Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal
Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L.
REV. 363 (1996) (responding to Professor McCaffery’s egalitarian analysis).
54
See Fried, supra note 48, at 133–34 (discussing Dworkin’s concept of brute luck).
55
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283,
293 (1981).
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56

themselves are required to file tax returns. And even if a taxpayer earns
so little money that he is not required to file a tax return, his income will
probably be reported to the IRS by the person who pays him. 57
Additionally, low-income taxpayers must file a return in order to obtain
what are essentially welfare benefits in the form of the earned income tax
credit.58 Earning enough money to survive, or obtaining help from the
government if one does not earn enough money, should not in itself be
considered a risky choice, and a taxpayer should not be required to bear the
possible negative consequences of that choice in Dworkin’s scheme. 59
However, as Dworkin points out, the gap between brute luck and
option luck can be bridged. If insurance against a possible (brute bad luck)
event is available, then there is no reason to compensate an individual who
chooses not to purchase that insurance and is subsequently visited by brute
bad luck. Dworkin gives the example of two individuals who are both
blinded in the same accident. If blindness insurance was available, and one
individual chose to purchase it and one did not, there is no reason,
Dworkin argues, to redistribute resources from the insured to the
uninsured; both have had brute bad luck, but any difference between them
is a matter of option luck. Similarly, if the uninsured individual is the only
56
The general rule is that all individuals with gross income at least equal to the exemption amount
($3400 in 2007) must file a return. I.R.C. § 6012(a); IRS, Publication 501—Introductory Material,
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p501/ar01.html (last visited June 24, 2008). However, this general rule
is largely swallowed by its exceptions, which permit certain taxpayers to add one or more standard
deductions to the cut-off amount. For example, an unmarried individual need not file a tax return if he
is neither a surviving spouse nor a head of a household, and his annual gross income is less than the
exemption amount plus the standard deduction. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(1)(A)(i). In 2007, the cut-off for such
a taxpayer was $8750.
IRS, Publication 501—Introductory Material, http://www.irs.gov/
publications/p501/ar01.html (last visited June 24, 2008). The poverty line in 2007 for an individual
under 65 was $10,787. U.S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division,
Poverty Thresholds 2007, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh07.html (last
visited June 17, 2008).
57
The person who pays him will be required to report these payments regardless of whether he is
an employee or an independent contractor for tax purposes.
58
IRS,
Do
You
Qualify
for
the
Earned
Income
Tax
Credit?,
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=153996,00.html (last visited June 24, 2008). Interestingly,
taxpayers who file for the EITC are more likely, not less likely, to face audits, as compared with
taxpayers who have not applied for that credit. This is so because auditing taxpayers who claim the
EITC has been an IRS project. For more information about the IRS EITC project see supra text
accompanying notes 10–12. See also IRS’ USE OF RANDOM SELECTION, supra note 12, at 2–3, 8
(reporting findings of IRS projects, including the earned income credit).
59
See, e.g., Martin E. Sandbu, On Dworkin’s Brute-Luck–Option-Luck Distinction and the
Consistency of Brute-Luck Egalitarianism, 3 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 283, 294–99 (2004) (discussing the
“reasonability” refinement of Dworkin’s theory, that is, that “if the riskless prospect is unreasonable,
then brute luck is only converted into option luck in so far as the least risky reasonable prospect
provides insurance”). This discussion is not meant to suggest that all who earn a minimum amount of
money file tax returns or are somehow reported to the IRS. Some people are entirely “off the books.”
See generally SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE
URBAN POOR (2006). This discussion is simply meant to suggest that all else being equal, it seems
highly unlikely, and highly unreasonable, that an individual would choose to remove himself entirely
from the tax system in an attempt to avoid random audit costs alone (as opposed to removing oneself
from government oversight in an attempt to avoid taxes or regulation).
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one blinded, there is no reason to redistribute resources to him. 60 As
Dworkin states, “[I]f everyone had an equal risk of suffering some
catastrophe that would leave him or her handicapped, and everyone knew
roughly what the odds were and had ample opportunity to insure—then
handicaps would pose no special problem for equality of resources.”61
While being randomly picked to bear audit costs may be brute bad
luck, if it is possible to insure against these costs, there is not necessarily
any fairness-based reason to compensate individuals for audit costs.
Moreover, the luck egalitarian is not posing the empirical question of
whether the market has actually provided insurance. Rather, the luck
egalitarian poses the question of whether the market is able to provide
insurance to the extent that people want that insurance. If people do not
want insurance against random audit costs, the government need not—
indeed, should not—compensate people for the costs of random audits,
because government compensation is essentially forced insurance. If, on
the other hand, people do want such insurance, and the market is not able
to provide that insurance for some reason, then the government should step
in.62
From an ex ante perspective, randomly imposing audit costs is fair.
From an ex post perspective, randomly imposing audit costs without
compensation is also fair, if insurance against these costs is available. As
the next Part discusses, such insurance is in fact available for most
taxpayers, and therefore not compensating these taxpayers for random
audit costs is fair.
B. Audit Insurance
As this Part describes, research into the world of commercial tax
preparers and insurers demonstrates that a market for audit insurance
exists, and therefore luck egalitarianism would not generally require the
government to compensate individuals for randomly imposed audit costs.
However, fairness may require the government to compensate randomly
audited individuals, in particular low-income taxpayers, for whom the
audit insurance market has failed.
1. The Market for Audit Insurance
Taxpayers can in fact purchase insurance against audit costs. H&R
Block, the most frequently used paid tax preparer, and TurboTax, the most
60

Dworkin, supra note 55, at 296–97.
Id. at 297. There is a different outcome if the risk of catastrophe is not equally (randomly)
distributed among individuals. Id.
62
Cf. Fried, supra note 48, at 130 (noting that from a welfarist perspective, government
compensation for losses may increase overall welfare if investors want insurance but the market cannot
provide it, but also noting that this increase in welfare may be offset by the costs of government
intervention, and thus such compensation may provide no net gain in welfare).
61
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frequently used electronic tax preparer, both offer audit insurance for a
relatively small additional fee. 63 This insurance seems to be intended for
the risk-averse taxpayer; as H&R Block explains:
Q. Who should use H&R Block Peace of Mind®?
A. Those clients who want no surprises after filing their
taxes. It’s a smart way to make sure you’re covered no
matter how complex your tax situation. The benefits of the
Peace of Mind® Extended Service plan will be invaluable in
the event that you . . . need representation because the IRS
questions your tax return.64
The advertising for TurboTax’s audit insurance, provided in affiliation
with TaxResources Incorporated, seems to play on the relief that the audit
insurance will bring from having to deal with the IRS:
TaxResources will professionally defend you in an
income tax audit for any tax year for which you have
purchased a membership. This includes all communications
and meetings with the IRS or state taxing agency, from
receipt of the first notice to completion of the audit.
TaxResources will defend you throughout the entire audit
process . . . . You never meet with the IRS!65
In other words, TurboTax suggests that its coverage will even relieve
the taxpayer of nonmonetary costs, because TaxResources will interact
63
H&R
Block,
Peace
of
Mind®
Extended
Service
Plan,
http://www.hrblock.com/taxes/doing_my_taxes/products/popup/pop_pom_features.html (last visited
June 22, 2008) (offering, for thirty dollars, an “extended service plan” under which, for no additional
fee, an H&R Block agent represents the taxpayer if the taxpayer is audited); Turbo Tax, Product List,
https://secureportal.taxaudit.com/intuit/SpecialPrograms/CompleteProductListJoinNow.aspx?pc=A
(last visited June 22, 2008) (offering, for $39.95, a plan under which, for no additional fee, TurboTax
provides a representative for the taxpayer if the taxpayer is audited); TurboTax, Audit Defense
Membership Agreement, http://turbotax.intuit.com/corp/auditdefense.jhtml (last visited June 22, 2008)
(describing the Tax Audit Defense plan). The majority of taxpayers use a paid preparer. For example,
out of approximately 134,000,000 individual returns filed for the 2005 tax year, approximately
80,000,000, or sixty-percent, were prepared by a paid preparer. IRS, 2005 ESTIMATED D ATA LINE
COUNTS INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
2005linecnt.pdf. H&R Block generally prepares close to sixteen percent of U.S. individual tax returns
filed each year.
H&R BLOCK INC., FORM 10-K 6 (2007), available at http://ccbn.
10kwizard.com/xml/download.php?repo=tenk&ipage=5023553&format=PDF (reporting filing 15.6%
of U.S. tax returns for tax year 2004; 15.7% for tax year 2005; and 16.1% for tax year 2006).
TurboTax sold about thirteen million programs, either software packages or on-line returns, for tax year
2006, so it probably accounted for slightly less than ten percent of returns filed that year. Historical
TurboTax Unit Sales Data, http://http-download.intuit.com/http.intuit/CMO/intuit/investors/TurboTax_
historical_data_for_release.pdf (last visited May 5, 2008).
64
H&R Block, Peace of Mind Extended Service Plan, http://www.hrblock.com/taxes/doing_my_
taxes/products/popup/pop_pom_features.html (last visited June 24, 2008).
65
Turbo Tax, What is Tax Audit Defense?, https://secureportal.taxaudit.com/intuit/StaticContent.
aspx?scf=SpecialPrograms/WhatIsTaxAuditDefense.htm (last visited June 24, 2008) (emphasis in
original).
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with the IRS on the taxpayer’s behalf, thus largely eliminating the
discomfort—the emotional costs—that the experience of an audit may
impose on a taxpayer.
TurboTax also includes, in its description of the “eight types of audits”
that a taxpayer might face, a paragraph on random audits, which it
describes as follows:
In order to improve the IRS’s audit selection process, the
IRS randomly selects individual tax returns for audit. This
audit plan, called the National Research Program[,] is the
successor to the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement
Program (TCMP). This audit is certainly the most intrusive
by its very nature. Every entry on the tax return can be
examined, line by line. For instance, if a child was claimed
as a dependent, you will need to provide the birth certificate
to prove that the child is yours and proof that the child was
actually living with you in the tax year being audited. The
IRS is currently performing these audits nationwide. 66
Jackson Hewitt, the second-largest tax return preparer,67 takes a
slightly different approach. Instead of offering full audit representation for
an extra fee, Jackson Hewitt claims to offer, as one Jackson Hewitt
franchisee explains, “free audit assistance to customers who receive an
audit notice from the IRS. In fact, our offices provide free tax advice and
audit assistance year-round, regardless of the Jackson Hewitt location in
which the taxpayer’s return was prepared.”68
Therefore, if a taxpayer chooses to have his return prepared by H&R
Block or to use the TurboTax program, he has the opportunity to purchase
audit cost insurance. A taxpayer who has his return prepared by Jackson
Hewitt apparently does not have to pay anything extra for audit cost
insurance.
Individuals who do not use these preparers might also be able to obtain
audit cost insurance. A wealthier taxpayer who has his own private tax
preparer and wants to purchase insurance separately might be able to
purchase insurance against audit costs directly from an insurance company.
Some corporations currently buy insurance to protect themselves from bad
substantive tax results (for example, the IRS’s ruling that a transaction is
66
TurboTax, The Eight Types of Audits, https://secureportal.taxaudit.com/intuit/StaticContent.
aspx?scf=StandardContent/EightTypesOfAudits.htm (last visited June 24, 2008) (emphasis deleted).
67
Jackson Hewitt Tax Serv. Inc., Annual Report (Form10-K), at 2 (June 29, 2007), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.u4FSm.htm [hereinafter J ACKSON HEWITT 2007 10-K]. Jackson
Hewitt prepares about 2.4% of the individual tax returns filed each year. Id. (“In 2007, our network . . .
prepared 3.65 million tax returns. We estimate our network prepared approximately 4% of all tax
returns prepared by a paid tax return preparer.”).
68
C K Ventures, Inc., Products & Services, http://www.ckventuresinc.com/products.html (last
visited June 24, 2008).
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not tax-free, and the pricing of that insurance is presumably based, in part,
on the probability that the substantive behavior will be detected). In these
instances, the corporation will be audited. 69 Proceeds of the policies may
be used in part to pay for audit costs. Some high-net-worth individuals
also purchase tax insurance. 70 If such an individual were concerned about
audit costs, he could likely find an insurance company willing to write a
policy, probably for a very low premium. 71 Finally, in some states,
taxpayers may purchase prepaid legal services that, while not technically
insurance, include audit representation for no additional fee. 72
Thus, because audit insurance appears to be available for those who
wish to purchase it, fairness does not generally require the government to
compensate taxpayers for their audit costs.
2. When the Market Fails
There may, however, be an exception to the general rule that fairness
does not require the government to compensate taxpayers for randomly
imposed audit costs: fairness may require the government to compensate
individuals who do not have access to insurance against random audit
costs. In particular, if low-income individuals do not have access to
effective audit insurance, fairness requires the government to reimburse
them for their audit costs.
For example, Jackson Hewitt markets itself to low-income taxpayers.
As Jackson Hewitt itself explains, its customers generally file early in the
tax season, in order to avail themselves of tax refunds, and generally have
lower adjusted gross incomes than taxpayers who file later in the season
and do not need the money from their tax refunds.73 While slightly more
than half of those filing tax returns in the United States have adjusted gross
income of less than $35,000, more than seventy-five percent of Jackson
Hewitt customers fall within this income range. 74
Imagine that the audit cost insurance that Jackson Hewitt bundles with
69
See generally Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Law Insurance, 25 VA.
TAX REV. 339 (2005). There is some debate about whether such insurance should be allowed, because
it may be undesirable to allow corporations to shift the risk of engaging in bad tax behavior, such as tax
shelters. Id. at 395–400.
70
Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Economic Substance Comes to Estate Planning, 2004 TAX
NOTES TODAY 105-2, June 1, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, TNT File.
71
Premia for substantial tax insurance policies are generally extremely low. Kenneth A. Gary,
New Opportunity for Tax Lawyers: Insuring Tax Transactions, 2004 TAX N OTES TODAY 130-8, July 7,
2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, TNT File. Given the low probability of being randomly
selected for audit and the relatively low cost of audit, insuring against randomly imposed audit costs
should also cost very little.
72
Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., http://www.ceai.org/fbenefits/prepaid_legal/prepaid_legal_
services.htm (last visited July 28, 2008). In some states (New York, for example), Pre-Paid Legal
Services’ audit representation requires additional payments on top of the flat fee.
73
JACKSON HEWITT 2007 10-K, supra note 67, at 2.
74
Id.
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its general tax preparation package is sometimes ineffective. This might
not be far from the truth. The Better Business Bureau lists a number of
Jackson Hewitt franchises with unsatisfactory records due to failure to
respond to complaints regarding guarantee issues.75 And at least two class
action lawsuits have been filed against Jackson Hewitt alleging, among
other claims, that it regularly urges taxpayers for whom it has prepared
fraudulent returns to purchase audit insurance in the form of its “Gold
Guarantee,” and then refuses to honor the guarantee. 76 One lawsuit was
dismissed without prejudice;77 as of May 2008, the other was still
pending.78 In other words, it is possible that at least some Jackson Hewitt
franchises do not provide effective representation—or perhaps any
representation—before the IRS.
It is also possible that low-income taxpayers who use Jackson Hewitt
would be unable to switch to H&R Block or another tax preparer who
would offer audit insurance if, for example, the only tax preparation
“shop” in the neighborhood is Jackson Hewitt. Some of these taxpayers
might pay someone else—perhaps a neighbor—to prepare their taxes,79 but
it seems likely that the neighbor would not be in a position to offer
effective audit cost insurance.
It seems highly unlikely that a low-income taxpayer would be able to
purchase a free-standing audit cost policy from an insurer. Perhaps this is
because low-income taxpayers are not well-informed about the possibility
of insurance, or perhaps it is because insurance companies have no interest
in marketing tax insurance to individuals who would, if audit insurance
were priced fairly, pay only minimal premiums and have little or no use for
more expensive tax insurance policies. For example, low-income
taxpayers will probably not be engaging in sophisticated estate planning. 80
Thus, if low-income individuals who want audit cost insurance are not able
to obtain it because the market will not provide it, fairness requires the

75
Better Business Bureau, http://us.bbb.org (follow hyperlink “Check Out a Business or Charity”,
search for “Jackson Hewitt”) (last searched Sept. 17, 2008).
76
Complaint, Chapman v. Jackson Hewitt Inc., No. 07-2910, D.N.J (filed June 22, 2007);
Complaint, Wooley v. Jackson Hewitt Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 964 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
77
JACKSON HEWITT TAX SERV. INC., FORM 10-Q 14 (2007), available at http://investing.
businessweek.com/research/stocks/financials/drawFiling.asp?docKey=137-0001193125072614766Q09DHILLI5V8UV4B7SRO45JGD&docFormat=HTM&formType=10-Q (stating that a joint
stipulation of dismissal without prejudice was approved by the court in Chapman v. Jackson Hewitt
Inc. on October 31, 2007).
78
JACKSON HEWITT TAX SERV. INC., FORM 10-Q 14 (2008), available at http://investing.
businessweek.com/research/stocks/financials/drawFiling.asp?docKey=137-00011931250805172855B6314JGBFA63BRLV41SCSSQP&docFormat=HTM&formType=10-Q (stating that a decision by
the court on a motion to dismiss Wooley v. Jackson Hewitt Inc. was pending).
79
See, e.g., VENKATESH, supra note 59, at 17, 32, 34, 106 (discussing off-the-books tax
preparation).
80
Cf. Sheppard, supra note 70 (stating that some wealthy taxpayers purchase tax insurance for
family limited partnerships, an estate planning technique that arguably lacks economic substance).
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government to compensate these individuals for their audit costs.
There is another twist here, however: the amount of that compensation
might well be zero, because the government already has a program in place
that prevents low-income individuals from having to bear audit costs. Low
Income Taxpayer Clinics provide free or low-cost audit representation to
taxpayers who meet certain income and other need-based criteria.82 These
clinics are partially funded by the IRS83 but are completely independent of
the government, 84 which helps prevent problems that might arise from the
government’s directly insuring against harms it causes. There is currently
at least one federally funded Low Income Taxpayer Clinic in each of the
fifty states, Washington, D.C., Guam, and Puerto Rico.85 As one law
school’s website describes its clinic,
The clinic provides legal assistance to unrepresented, low
income individuals who are being audited by the Internal
Revenue Service . . . . [A]nyone who files a tax return is
subject to audit[,] and . . . thousands of low income returns
are audited each year. Tax clinic clients include cab drivers,
travel agents, construction workers, retirees, flight attendants,
nurses, high school teachers, car salesmen, waiters,
immigrants, household workers, and many, many taxpayers
with marginal businesses and terrible records.86
Legal aid societies also sponsor such clinics. For example, the LowIncome Taxpayer Clinic (LITC) of the Legal Aid Society of New York
assists taxpayers in disputes with the IRS and with the New York State
Department of Taxation and Finance. Typical cases involve tax issues
such as “[e]arned income tax credit (EITC); [c]hild tax credit; [f]iling
status; [e]xemptions for dependents; [i]nnocent spouse relief; and
[e]mployee classification.”87 The free audit representation these clinics
provide thus takes the place of audit insurance for low-income taxpayers.
81
Cf. Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1151, 1199–
1202 (2006) (arguing that fairness may require income averaging for low-income earners, but not for
the wealthy, because “[r]ough justice is always roughest on the poor”).
82
The IRS provides funding to a clinic only if 90% of the clinic’s clients make less than 250% of
the poverty guidelines (e.g., $26,000 for an individual in 2008). IRS, LOW INCOME TAXPAYER CLINIC
LIST (IRS PUB. 4143) (2008) [hereinafter LOW INCOME TAXPAYER CLINIC LIST], available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4134.pdf.
83
The IRS is authorized to provide a clinic up to $100,000 in a matching-fund grant. I.R.C.
§ 7526(c)(2), (5) (2002).
84
LOW INCOME TAXPAYER CLINIC LIST, supra note 82.
85
Id. Larger states have more than one clinic. California and New York, for example, each have
ten low-income taxpayer clinics that represent clients in controversies; Florida has eight, and Texas has
six. Id.
86
American University, Washington College of Law, Janet R. Spragens Federal Tax Clinic,
http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical/federal.cfm (last visited June 28, 2008).
87
Legal Aid Society of New York, Low-Income Taxpayer Clinic, http://www.legalaid.org/en/whatwedo/civilpractice/low-incometaxpayerclinic.aspx (last visited June 28, 2008).
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Clinics may not resolve the compensation question in every case.
Some taxpayers who are eligible to receive services from taxpayer clinics
may not live close enough to a clinic to take advantage of those services. 88
Other taxpayers might make too much money to receive services from the
clinic, but might still not be able to afford effective audit insurance.
Fairness would require compensation for such taxpayers.
Thus, an egalitarian analysis suggests that because the market provides
affordable and effective audit cost insurance to most taxpayers who want
such insurance, it is generally fair for the government not to compensate
taxpayers for the costs imposed by random audits. Nevertheless, fairness
may require the government to compensate certain taxpayers, in particular
low-income taxpayers for whom the market has failed.
****
It is possible, however, notwithstanding philosophical arguments to the
contrary, that people generally believe it is unfair for the government not to
compensate taxpayers whom it selects randomly for audit. Part IV
explains how a welfarist analysis of the compensation question suggests
that this perceived unfairness should be a cause for concern and may in
fact merit compensation. 89 Part V uses this welfarist framework to
compare random audits with other situations, including checkpoint
searches, jury service, and military services, in which the government
imposes or has imposed costs randomly on subsets of individuals and
either does not compensate the randomly selected individuals for the costs
imposed or compensates them incompletely. 90
IV. WELFARISM AND PERCEIVED FAIRNESS
Welfarism, unlike egalitarianism, is concerned with fairness only if
that fairness somehow contributes to social well-being. Empirical work
suggests that a welfarist should be concerned with perceived fairness in the
context of tax compliance because people have a “taste for fairness” in tax
law, and are more likely to comply with laws that they perceive as fair.
This Part first reviews welfarism in general, then shows how a welfarist
analysis can be applied to tax compliance to highlight individuals’ taste for
fairness in the context of law in general, and tax law in particular, and
finally suggests one particular type of cost that unfairness related to
noncompensation may impose.
88
Some taxpayers might live close enough to a clinic to seek services but might not know that the
clinic exists. Presumably, this situation could be resolved by educating taxpayers about the clinics and
would not require compensation.
89
See infra Part IV.
90
See infra Part V.
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A. Welfarism
Welfarism evaluates social choices based on how these choices affect
overall well-being.91 In a purely welfarist world, decisionmakers would
select a policy if that policy resulted in higher social welfare. Social
welfare is, in turn, determined by reference only to individuals’ well-being,
or welfare. There are many ways to aggregate individual welfare—many
social welfare functions—and different social welfare functions may
provide different results. Thus utilitarianism, which determines social
welfare by simply adding together each individual’s welfare, is only one of
many possible social welfare functions. Another possible welfarist
approach might be to weigh the welfare of some individuals (e.g., poor
people) more than the welfare of other individuals (e.g., rich people) before
summing across individuals. This approach would sometimes result in
different policies than would simple utilitarianism.
Just as there is no single social welfare function implied by welfarism,
there is also no consensus on how an individual’s welfare should be
determined or quantified. An individual might be considered to have
higher welfare if his preferences are satisfied, if his happiness is increased,
or if he has more items on an “objective list” of “welfare goods” that might
include friendship, health care, and so forth.
From a pure welfarist perspective, fairness, where fairness is a
deontological principle concerned with something other than social wellbeing, is not an independent evaluative principle and therefore is not
necessarily relevant to any given analysis. However, if social well-being
depends in some way on fairness—if, for example, individuals have a
“taste for fairness”—then a welfarist should factor fairness into his
analysis.92
As Part IV shows, empirical work suggests that individuals do in fact
have a taste for fairness in law. In particular, empirical work suggests that
people tend to comply more with laws that they perceive as fair. 93 In other
91
For a good summary of welfarism, on which the following description relies, see Matthew D.
Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal Applications, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 279, 291–96 (2006), and ADLER & POSNER, supra note 45, at 23.
92
See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 166 (2d. ed. 2006) (suggesting that issues
of fairness may be incorporated into an expanded model of expected utility); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110
YALE L.J. 237, 249 (2000) (“[N]otions of fairness may be relevant under welfare economics, even
though they are not considered to be independent evaluative principles. First, individuals may have
tastes for notions of fairness, which is to say that their well-being may depend on whether what they
view to be fair treatment is in fact provided . . . . Second, notions of fairness may serve as proxy
principles that may be useful in identifying policies that advance welfare . . . . Third, notions of fairness
can be important as rules of common morality, which are valuable to teach and reinforce because they
lead individuals to be less opportunistic in their interactions in their everyday lives.”).
93
A welfarist might initially reject as irrelevant the fairness questions raised by random audit
costs, arguing that individuals should be compensated for audit costs simply because of the declining
marginal utility of money—in other words, even though fairness does not matter, equality still requires
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words, in welfarist terms, these empirical results suggest that people derive
utility from complying with laws they perceive to be fair.
B. A Taste for Fairness in the Tax Law
Many people have a preference for fairness.94 Of particular interest for
this Article, empirical work suggests that one factor that affects whether
taxpayers comply with the law is whether taxpayers perceive the law as
fair, procedurally, distributively, or, perhaps, retributively.95 This Subpart
discusses each type of perceived fairness in turn.
1. Procedural Fairness
Empirical studies show that people tend to obey laws in general, and
tax law in particular, if they believe the authorities are legitimate, and
people tend to believe authorities are legitimate if they believe that
authorities implement the law in a procedurally just fashion.96 In his
classic study of Chicago residents’ views of and experiences with law
enforcement and the justice system, Tom Tyler found that individuals were

compensation. The idea here is that the more money one has, the less utility attaches to the next dollar.
Imagine a society of ten people, in which everyone has $100, and imagine that one person is randomly
selected to bear audit costs of $10. The welfarist might argue that everyone should be taxed in order to
compensate this individual for his costs, because, given the declining marginal utility of money, it’s
better for everyone to have $99 (because everyone pays $1 of tax, and then that $10 is given to the
person who is audited) than for nine people to have $100 and one person to have $90. Fairness, on this
view, is irrelevant, but equality is relevant. Cf., e.g., Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 91, at 296–304
(discussing “equity-regarding” welfarism).
The assumption that money has a declining marginal utility may be incorrect. See, e.g., Walter J.
Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 472–79
(1952) (explaining some “formidable objections” to the conclusion that money has a declining marginal
utility). But even if this assumption is correct, the equality argument is not a satisfactory answer to the
fairness question, for at least two reasons in addition to the fact that, as discussed in the text, people do
in fact have a taste for fairness in the tax context. First, this argument simply refuses the fairness
question. The claim to be addressed is that people should be compensated for randomly imposed audit
costs because it is unfair not to compensate them. Pure welfarism is a consequentialist approach that is
concerned only with social well-being, and so it might (or might not) require an equitable distribution
of goods, or equality of welfare; thus welfarism might require the government to compensate certain
taxpayers for audit costs if such compensation would distribute income more equitably. But requiring
an equitable distribution of welfare is not the same as requiring fairness. In other words, the welfarist’s
equality argument might seem close to a fairness argument, but it is still not a discussion of fairness; it
is a discussion of welfare. And, second, those who are selected for audit do not have an equal amount
of wealth prior to the imposition of audit costs. Compensation could be reworked so that money was
moved around only within roughly equal slices of the population, but this begins to change the
discussion entirely.
94
See, e.g., Michael B. Dorff & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Miscalculating Welfare 15–18
(Southwestern L. Sch. Working Paper No. 0713, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102819 (discussing various empirical evidence of a preference for fairness).
95
See, e.g., Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming
Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1165 (2006) (“The importance of perceptions
of fairness to cooperation, long assumed by prominent legal theorists, has been thoroughly established
across a broad array of recent empirical studies . . . .”) (citations omitted).
96
See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 92, 3–6.
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more likely to comply with laws that they believed to be just.
In particular, if individuals believed that laws were implemented
justly—if they perceived that the authorities were procedurally just—they
tended to believe that the authorities were legitimate, which in turn led to
compliance. This is to be distinguished from an outcome-oriented
approach; that is, even people who did not get the legal outcome they
desired sometimes felt that the law was implemented in a procedurally just
fashion and that the result was just, and this in turn sometimes caused them
to comply with the law.98 Individuals tended to believe the laws were
enforced justly if they believed that the authorities were impartial—that is,
the authorities were trying to be fair, honest, and unbiased. Individuals
also felt it was important that the authorities demonstrated a concern for
individuals’ rights.
Tyler’s work did not study individuals’ views of and experiences with
tax authorities in particular, but consistent with Tyler’s work, studies have
shown that taxpayers who believe the IRS is fair are more likely to comply
with tax reporting and payment requirements.99 These studies demonstrate
that taxpayers tend to comply with tax laws if they believe that the
procedures the tax authority uses to determine tax liability and enforce tax
laws are fair—that is, taxpayers respond to perceived procedural justice. 100
For example, tax compliance might be improved if individuals feel they are
treated “equitably and consistently”101 and that tax authorities “tr[y] to be
fair when making their decisions.”102 Interestingly, although consistency
would seem to be an important element of procedural justice, studies have
shown that consistency over time or as between individuals does not seem
to have a strong effect on whether people believed that authorities were
procedurally just,103 suggesting that randomness may be consistent with
97

Id. at 8–15.
Id. at 269–70 (contrasting instrumental theories of compliance with normative theories of
compliance).
99
See, e.g., Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in
WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 223 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (arguing that procedural fairness increases
compliance and defining procedural fairness as whether taxpayers can tell “their side of the issue,”
whether the IRS tries to be fair, whether the IRS’s decisions are correctable, and whether individuals
are treated “equitable and consistently”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to
Compliance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 614–17 (2007); Leandra Lederman,
Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 991, 996–1004 (2003) (discussing
various studies that show that perceived procedural fairness increases compliance with laws in general
and tax laws in particular).
100
Michael Wenzel, The Impact of Outcome Orientation and Justice Concerns on Tax
Compliance: The Role of Taxpayers’ Identity, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 631 (2002). Certain kinds
of noncompliance, such as underreporting income and overreporting deductions, are particularly likely
to be affected by a taxpayer’s belief that a taxing authority is fair. Id.
101
Smith, supra note 99, at 224.
102
Wenzel, supra note 100, app. at 644–45. Other factors might include whether taxpayers have
input in formulating tax laws, whether taxpayers have the chance to tell their side of the story, and how
correctable decisions are. Id. at 631; Smith, supra note 99, at 224–25.
103
TYLER, supra note 92, at 153–54.
98
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perceived procedural justice.
2. Distributive Fairness
People also tend to obey laws if they believe that the outcome of the
laws is distributively just.104 Although Tyler does not focus on distributive
justice, he notes that whereas assessments of procedural justice tend to
influence views and beliefs, studies show that assessments of distributive
justice tend to influence behavior. Thus, assessments of distributive justice
might lead to compliance (or noncompliance) directly, without being
mediated by an increased belief in legitimacy. 105
The burden of audit costs might be perceived as, and in some sense is,
an additional tax. Some taxpayers bear this additional burden, and some
do not. If taxpayers are concerned about horizontal equity, in particular
whether similarly situated taxpayers are treated similarly ex post, they may
object to being asked to bear a greater burden than other taxpayers who, for
example, have the same income level. 106 Some studies show that
perceptions of horizontal equity affect compliance; others show they do
not.107 Furthermore, we do not know whether taxpayers view the burden of
audit costs as raising questions of horizontal equity, or, if they are
concerned about horizontal equity, whether they prefer ex post horizontal
equity to ex ante horizontal equity.
Similarly, the opportunity to avoid tax may also be seen as a resource
that is distributed fairly (or unfairly) among taxpayers. For example, some
taxpayers may feel that wealthy individuals have more of a chance to avoid
taxes—that the resource of “avoiding tax” is distributed disproportionately
and unfairly to wealthy taxpayers.108 In that case, random audits might be
perceived as distributively fair because wealthy taxpayers would no longer
have more of a chance than other taxpayers to evade audit costs or audits
and thus to evade having to pay the correct amount of tax. Instead,
everyone would have the same ex ante opportunity to avoid the costs of
audit. In contrast, statistical profiling (for example, using DIF scores to
104

See, e.g., id. at 103–04 (discussing society’s tendency to obey laws perceived as distributively

fair).
105

See, e.g., id. (citing Sheldon Alexander & Marian Ruderman, The Role of Procedural and
Distributive Justice in Organizational Behavior, 1 SOC. JUST. RES. 177 (1987)).
106
Some policymakers and courts continue to use the concept of horizontal equity to evaluate tax
provisions. See, e.g., Dilts v. United States, 845 F. Supp. 1505, 1510 (D. Wy. 1994) (“One
fundamental purpose of the tax code is to achieve ‘horizontal equity’—that is, to treat similarly situated
people in the same manner.”); Kenseth v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 399, 425 n.15 (2000) (referring to results
in certain cases as “unsatisfactory . . . from a horizontal equity standpoint”); CONG. RES. SERV.,
ADDITIONAL STANDARD TAX DEDUCTION FOR THE BLIND 3 (July 12, 2006) (“It may . . . be said that
the additional standard deduction accorded the blind does not meet horizontal equity principles.”).
107
See, e.g., Michael Wenzel, Tax Compliance and the Psychology of Justice: Mapping the Field,
in TAXING DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 41, 49–50 (Valerie
Braithwaite ed., 2002) (reviewing studies).
108
Id.
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select taxpayers for audit) might be seen as distributively unfair, because
individuals with characteristics that suggest they might try to evade taxes
would have less of a chance to avoid the costs of audit. This might seem
especially unfair if those characteristics were themselves morally neutral—
for example, if people who took home office deductions tended to be
audited, and thus to receive a too-small share of the resource of “avoiding
audit.” On the other hand, these two factors might interact; if statistical
profiling tended to result in audits of wealthy individuals, taxpayers might
feel statistical profiling was more distributively fair than random audits,
because it would balance the perception that wealthy individuals are more
likely able to evade taxes.
3. Retributive Fairness
Finally, retributive justice may also be a factor in why people obey the
laws.109 If an audited taxpayer believes that an audit and the costs it
imposes are retributive, and the taxpayer believes he is innocent, he may
feel he is being treated unfairly, and this may negatively affect his future
compliance with the tax law. This is the feeling that Senator Paul
Coverdell appeared to be playing on when he introduced legislation that
would have banned random audits.110 He claimed that the IRS had
“identified a new enemy: innocent taxpayers,” who had
committed no wrong, [but were simply] unfortunate victims
of an IRS practice called “random audits,” where the IRS
simply picks people out of a hat in the hope it can uncover
some wrongdoing. . . . Americans will not accept the IRS’s
assertion that enforcement requires them to go after innocent,
low-income taxpayers by using random audits that make no
distinction between the guilty and innocent . . . . Congress is
deadly serious about the need to end random audits.111
Putting aside whether the audits Senator Coverdell was attacking truly
were random, 112 he may have been making a retributive justice point: if
audits themselves seem punitive, 113 and punishing innocent individuals at
109

Id. at 58–60 (“[R]esearchers have argued that taxpayers subject to investigation . . . could
resent their treatment, find . . . audits unreasonably intrusive, and as a consequence develop more
negative attitudes towards the [taxing authority].”).
110
144 CONG. REC. S3791 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1998) (introducing the Internal Revenue Service
Random Audit Prohibition Act).
111
Id.
112
Technically, the taxpayers to which Senator Coverdell referred were audited as part of certain
IRS projects. IRS’ USE OF RANDOM SELECTION, supra note 12, at 1–4. For a discussion of IRS
projects, see supra text accompanying notes 10–14. It also seems unlikely that Congress was “deadly
serious” about ending random audits, given that the bill was referred to the Committee on Finance and
then never heard from again. For a further discussion of Senator Coverdell’s concerns, see infra, text
accompanying notes 191–94.
113
Random audits are, of course, not intended to be punitive.
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random is unfair, then random audits may seem unfair.
Therefore, even a pure welfarist analysis should take into account
whether random audit costs are fair, or at least whether they seem fair. The
next Subpart describes more fully the form that a welfarist analysis of
individual tax compliance might take.
C. Welfarism and Optimal Taxation
A welfarist analysis of taxation often takes the form of an optimal
taxation model, that is, a model which maximizes social welfare subject to
certain constraints,114 which may represent, among other things, the
amount of revenue the government needs and how taxpayers respond to
taxes.115 As discussed above, social welfare is defined as some type of
aggregation of individual welfare. 116 This Subpart focuses on the
traditional definition of individual welfare in an optimal taxation model to
show that the traditional definition falls far short of explaining actual
compliance with tax law, highlighting how a preference for fairness is one
relevant factor that is excluded from that model.
Note that this Subpart presents a mathematical model of the conceptual
point above—that financial incentives do not fully explain tax compliance
in the United States—and may therefore be omitted by readers who prefer
to avoid formulas.
1. The Traditional Model
An optimal taxation model often includes the simplifying assumption
that an individual’s welfare is fully determined by consumption and the
action taken to produce that income. That is, where W is total welfare, C is
consumption, and a is the action taken that results in the income
(specifically, it results in probability levels over a set of possible income
values), it is often assumed that W = U(C) + G(a).117 Additionally,
because people are assumed to attempt to maximize their own utility,
individuals under a welfarist analysis will pay their taxes if the utility of
paying taxes is greater than the utility of not paying taxes. That is, where
I = realized income
114
The seminal article on this topic is James Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum
Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971).
115
See, e.g., William M. Gentry, Optimal Taxation, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION & TAX
POLICY 307, 307 (Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel, & Jane G. Gravelle eds., 1999).
116
See supra Part IV.A.
117
See, e.g., Mirrlees, supra note 114, at 176 (defining utility as a function of consumption and
time worked); Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution, 104 Q.
J. ECON. 399, 402 (1989) (defining welfare over consumption and action); David A. Weisbach, What
Does Happiness Research Tell Us About Taxation? 5 (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working
Paper No. 342 (2d Ser.), 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=995319 (“A simplifying
assumption often used [in optimal taxation] . . . is that utility is quasi-linear in consumption, so that
utility can be expressed as u = c + v(l) where c is consumption and l is labor effort.”).
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U(*) = utility of consumption
T = tax due on realized income
t = tax due on reported income
F = penalty for inaccurate reporting (if audited); F ≥ 0
p = probability of audit
a taxpayer should report accurately where
U(I – T) > pU(I – T – F) + (1 – p)U(I – t)
Fairness is irrelevant here. Of course, this equation oversimplifies
compliance. For example, even if the IRS audits a taxpayer, it is not
certain that the IRS will determine his actual taxable income. More
interesting for our purposes, this equation highlights one way the definition
of welfare provided above is too simple. The equation assumes that people
weigh the utility of complying with tax law against the utility of not
complying. Utility for these purposes is a function only of income, and the
relative outcomes of compliance and noncompliance are weighted by the
probability of audit. But, as many have noted, if this were truly how
people determined the utility of complying with tax law, nobody would
comply because audit rates are so low. 118
The explicit audit rate for individuals is less than one percent.119 Even
if a taxpayer could expect to pay, in addition to the tax he should have paid
had he reported correctly, a penalty equal to one hundred percent of that
tax,120 or if a taxpayer makes the decision whether to report purely by
weighing the expected financial outcomes, it would be irrational for any
118

See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 99, at 601 (“Traditional methods of enforcement through
audit and penalties explain only a small fraction of voluntary tax compliance.”); Lars P. Feld & Bruno
S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and
Responsive Regulation 5 (Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l Univ. 2005), available at
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/WP/76.pdf (“Several scholars have established that selfish
individuals would be rational not to pay taxes, because the probability of being detected and the size of
fines in many countries are so low that it is advantageous to evade. Tax payment is . . . taken to be a
‘quasi-voluntary’ act.”); Joel Slemrod, On Voluntary Compliance, Voluntary Taxes, and Social Capital,
51 NAT’L TAX J. 485, 485 (1998) (“Given the probability of audit and the penalties typically assessed,
evasion seems to be a winning proposition . . . the puzzle is not to explain why people evade, but rather
why people pay taxes—in the context of the standard economic model, people who voluntarily comply
are exhibiting nothing short of ‘pathological honesty.’”); see also Eric A. Posner, Law and Social
Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) (“A widespread view among
tax scholars holds that law enforcement does not explain why people pay taxes.”).
119
Over the last eight years it has been as low as .49% (in 2000) and as high as .98% (the
estimated rate for 2006). IRS, Fiscal Year 2006 Enforcement and Service Results, http://www.irs.gov/
pub/newsroom/11-06_enforcement_stats.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2008); Table 9—Examination
Coverage: Recommended and Average Recommended Additional Tax After Examination, by Type and
Size of Return, Fiscal Year 2007, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07db09ex.xls (last visited July 4,
2008) (stating that the total audit rate for individual returns in taxable year 2007 was .9%).
120
Generally, the maximum penalty for misreporting taxable income is only seventy-five percent
of the tax that would have been owed. This maximum penalty is imposed only if the IRS determines
that the taxpayer has misreported fraudulently. I.R.C. § 6663(a) (2002).
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given taxpayer to comply with tax reporting and payment requirements. 121
However, the mismatch between expected compliance and actual
compliance is somewhat less stark than the explicit audit rate implies
because the explicit audit rate understates how much information the
government receives about taxpayers.
Information reporting and
withholding taxes provide the government with information about the
taxpayer, or with tax payments on the taxpayer’s behalf, with little or no
input from the taxpayer.122 The tax code requires certain payors to submit
forms to the IRS stating how much was paid and to whom. 123 For example,
employers must submit W-2 forms to the IRS, with a copy to the
employee, and a bank paying interest must submit a Form 1099-INT to the
IRS, with a copy to the depositor. It is relatively easy for the IRS to
determine whether a taxpayer’s reporting matches up with what has been
reported by the payor. For example, the IRS has a matching program to
confirm that information reporting for wages matches taxpayers’ individual
returns.124 Employers are also required to withhold income taxes from
employees’ wages.125 Compliance rates with respect to wage and salary
income, which are subject to both information reporting and withholding,
121

Criminal sanctions may also play a deterrent role, but very few taxpayers are criminally
investigated, and most of the subjects of criminal tax investigations obtain their money from illegal
sources, such as narcotics, money laundering, or currency violations. In fiscal year 2007, for example,
the IRS criminal investigation program initiated 4211 investigations; only 1664, or about 40%, of these
investigations involved legal-source tax crimes. Also in 2007, the IRS criminal investigation program
obtained 2155 convictions. Of those individuals, 732, or about 34%, had been prosecuted due to
crimes related to legal-source income. Table 18—Criminal Investigation Program, by Status or
Disposition, Fiscal Year 2007, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07db18ci.xls (last visited July 4, 2008).
These investigations and convictions are related to returns filed in various fiscal years, and we do not,
of course, know the actual number of tax criminals, but to give a sense of how tiny the number of
criminal investigations is, the IRS received 138,894,000 individual income tax returns for the 2007 tax
year. Table 2—Numbers of Returns Filed, by Type of Return, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07db02nr.xls (last visited July 4, 2008).
122
See generally Lederman, supra note 99 (discussing the audit-like qualities of information
returns and withholding).
123
See generally I.R.C. §§ 6041–6053 (requiring, inter alia, information returns for interest
payments, I.R.C. § 6049, information returns for wages paid to employees, I.R.C. § 6051, and
information returns for certain purchases of fish, I.R.C. § 6050R (defining “fish” as including other
forms of aquatic life)).
124
J. RUSSELL GEORGE, HEARING BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, A CLOSER
LOOK AT THE SIZE AND SOURCES OF THE TAX GAP 21 (2006), available at http://www.treas.gov/
tigta/congress/congress_07262006.pdf.
125
I.R.C. § 3402(a). This system does not make cheating impossible, of course. For example, it
is possible for an employee to cheat by overstating the number of exemptions to which he is entitled, or
by claiming to be exempt from employment tax withholding. Claiming “exempt” status on Form W-4
was, as recently as 2006, on the IRS’s list of “the most notorious tax schemes” for the year. News
Release, IRS, IRS Announces “Dirty Dozen” Tax Scams for 2006 (Feb. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-06-025.pdf. See, e.g., The Disciples of Truth, Sec. 3402. Income
Tax Collected at Source, http://www.tax-freedom.com/ta06009.htm (last visited June 29, 2008) (“W-4s
are supposed to relate to employment taxes, why are you specifying deductions for the income tax on
your W-4? Are you a non-resident alien???? Did they tell you that you were voluntarily agreeing to
have your earnings subjected to income tax withholding as well as employment tax withholding? . . . .
You don’t have to participate in, or remain victimized by, this fraud if you don’t want to!”).
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are 95% or greater. For example, in 2001, taxpayers whose income was
subject to substantial information reporting and withholding reported
98.8% of their income accurately. 126
If we set aside the withholding and information reporting regime,
though, accurate reporting of net income that is subject to little or no
information reporting or withholding is still much higher than the explicit
audit rate would predict: about 46% of such income was accurately
reported in 2001.127 This compliance rate is far higher than it would be if
individuals were engaging in a purely financial cost-benefit analysis,
comparing the amount of money they expected to retain by misreporting
their income, on the one hand, with the amount of money they expected to
retain by reporting honestly. 128 Of course, taxpayers may be wildly
overestimating their chances of being audited,129 or of being subject to
criminal prosecution.130 But even if that is the case, it seems likely that
something further is needed to explain why taxpayers are complying more
than a cost-benefit analysis would predict, where costs and benefits are a
function of income only.
The next Subpart provides a formula that encapsulates the relevance of
perceived fairness to welfarists.
2. Expanding Utility
Put another way, when a taxpayer is deciding whether to comply with
tax law, his welfare function is apparently not defined simply over
consumption and income-producing action. There may be some utility (or
disutility) associated with the action of complying with the tax law itself.
126

See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX COMPLIANCE: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO REDUCE
TAX G AP USING A VARIETY OF APPROACHES 10 (2006) (indicating that 1.2% of individuals
subject to substantial information reporting and withholding misreported their income).
127
See id. (indicating that 53.9% of individuals subject to little or no reporting misreported their
income); see also Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1457–58 & n.22 (2003) (noting that the compliance rate for selfemployment income is about 42% and citing sources to support the proposition that “it is often stated in
the tax compliance literature that deterrence does not explain voluntary compliance levels in the United
States”).
128
Id. See generally Slemrod, supra note 118.
129
See, e.g., JAMES ALM, BETTY R. JACKSON & MICHAEL MCKEE, THE EFFECTS OF
COMMUNICATION AMONG TAXPAYERS ON COMPLIANCE 38 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/04alm.pdf (noting that nobody knows the extent to which taxpayers understand the true
audit rate, or how they form their beliefs about the audit rate, but hypothesizing, based on an
experiment, that communication between taxpayers regarding the audit rate increases compliance more
than communication from the IRS); Tom Herman, Fear of the Home Office Deduction, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 16, 2008, at D3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJ File (stating that “many” people do not
take home-office tax deductions in an attempt to avoid triggering an audit, but that these “fears of
getting audited are exaggerated,” and “most people who claim the home-office deduction don’t get
audited”); cf., e.g., Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications for
Tort and Contract Law, 11 S. CT. ECON. REV. 125, 125 (2004) (discussing empirical studies that show
“people make systematic errors when they estimate probabilities”).
130
See discussion supra note 121.
THE
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That is, instead of welfare equaling
U(C) + G(a)
where C is consumption and a is the action that produces the income, I
suggest that we should add at least one other term to the welfare function,
defining a function, H(x,y), as representing the utility of reporting income
that would result in tax equaling x where reporting actual income would
result in tax equaling y.131 Thus the welfare function would equal
U(C) + G(a) + H(x,y)
In other words, given current audit levels, a taxpayer who
is attempting to maximize his welfare and who complies with
tax law must derive utility from something more than
consumption and income-producing action. 132 Starting with
the compliance equation discussed above, 133 but taking into
account H, if
I = realized income
U(*) = utility of consumption
T = tax due on realized income
t = tax due on reported income
F = penalty for inaccurate reporting (if audited); F ≥ 0
p = probability of audit
H(x,y) = utility of reporting income resulting in tax x
where tax due on realized income is y
then a taxpayer should report accurately where
U(I – T) + H(T,T) > pU(I – T – F) + (1 – p)U(I – t) + H(t,T)
Notice that H is not weighted by the probability of audit. This is to
indicate that the taxpayer will derive the utility of reporting honestly (or

131

I assume (to simplify the notation) that the amount of tax due on income is a one-to-one
function. That is, there is only one value of reported income that will result in any given tax amount.
In other words, for any given income i and tax x, if reporting income i results in tax due of x, then if the
tax due is x, the taxpayer must have reported income i. Thus if the taxpayer owes tax T, the taxpayer
must have reported income I, his realized income—that is, the taxpayer must have reported honestly.
132
See generally Robert Cooter, The Intrinsic Value of Obeying a Law: Economic Analysis of the
Internal Viewpoint, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1275 (2006). Cooter makes essentially the same point,
although in different terms. He suggests that some people may be willing to pay to obey a law; that is,
instead of weighing the cost of obeying against the cost of disobeying, an individual who has
“internalized” obedience will obey if his willingness to pay to obey a law exceeds the cost of obeying
less the cost of disobeying. Thus, in Cooter’s account, an individual obeys if willingness-to-pay
exceeds the cost of obeying less the cost of disobeying. Id. at 1281–82.
133
See supra Part IV.C.1.
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not reporting honestly) regardless of whether he is audited.
There are likely many factors that determine H(T,T). For example,
holding all else equal, people may pay their taxes because they want to
obey social norms favoring tax compliance, so strengthening these norms
may increase H(T,T) (or decrease H(t,T)), and thus increase compliance. 135
And, crucially for our purposes, one element of a taxpayer’s welfare
function may relate to whether tax law is fair.136 As the previous Part
discusses, empirical work has shown that individuals tend to comply with
the law if they believe the law and legal authorities are procedurally and
distributively fair, and perhaps retributively fair as well.137
Therefore, examining whether randomly imposing audit costs seems
unfair illuminates whether compensating taxpayers for these costs is
desirable even if one is completely committed to a welfarist approach to
taxation. Put another way, a rule about imposing audit costs that appears
fair may increase H(T,T), and thus may increase taxpayer compliance and,
in turn, overall welfare.138
D. The Cost of Perceived Unfairness
Taking account of perceived fairness in a welfarist context may seem
to require an almost impossible precision. In order to determine whether
perceived fairness mandates compensation for randomly imposed audit
costs, we would have to monetize all costs and benefits associated with
random audits, including emotional costs and opportunity costs, and
134
As discussed infra Part IV.C.2. H may be defined in part by the probability of audit, but not
necessarily by the probability that the individual will be audited; rather, it may be determined by the
total probability of audit, over all possible incomes—that is, the entire probability function.
135
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 118, at 1782. As Posner notes, underenforcement may go handin-hand with strong social norms in favor of compliance. Id.
136
See, e.g., Dorff & Ferzan, supra note 94, at 18 (“Because individuals weight fairness so
heavily, any policy that seeks to enhance their welfare must take account of their fairness
preferences.”).
137
Some might argue that individuals prefer to comply with law that is actually fair, not with law
that they simply believe to be fair. Cf., e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 45, at 31 (“Ordinary citizens
really do have some preferences for things other than their own experiences. An individual may prefer
not to be exposed to a toxin. This is not the same as a preference not to perceive a risk from the
toxin.”). However, there is no objective definition of what it means for something to be fair. If a law is
not fair in the view of a taxpayer, the taxpayer does not get utility from complying with that law simply
because the law is fair in the view of a famous philosopher. Thus, if we assume that the government is
not lying about its approach to auditing, a law is fair for these purposes precisely when the taxpayer
believes it to be fair. Of course, a philosophical argument about fairness, such as the argument
presented supra Part III.A., may be relevant to the extent that it is persuasive to a large group of
taxpayers. For these purposes, however, it is not determinative.
138
The claim here is not that the fairness of random audits fully determines H(T,T). Indeed, it
seems highly likely that even the fairness of the tax system as a whole does not fully determine H(T,T).
What is more, while adding a term representing the utility of complying with the law may make the
utility function more descriptive of the real world, there may be some other factor altogether, unrelated
to the utility of complying with the law, that will make the overall welfare function even more accurate.
Thus, the claim is simply that adding H(T,T) may increase the accuracy of modeling the taxpayer’s
welfare function, and that, in turn, the fairness of random audits may have some effect on H(T,T).

194

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:163

determine whether monetized fairness-related costs tipped the balance
toward compensation.139 But this impossible precision is not unique to the
question of whether to compensate individuals for audit costs. Indeed,
most who make decisions by weighing costs and benefits either omit costs
that are not already monetized or engage in some sort of estimation or
“casual empiricism.”140
To incorporate fairness into a welfarist model, we must begin by
speculating on the relative costs of different kinds of perceived unfairness.
Different kinds of perceived unfairness likely impose different kinds of
costs. In particular, there may be factors that increase the costs of
unfairness in the context of failure to compensate taxpayers for randomly
imposed burdens. Frank Michelman’s work on demoralization costs
provides useful guidelines for thinking about the magnitude of the costs of
such unfairness. This Subpart describes Michelman’s work in the context
of takings, and then expands his definition of demoralization costs to take
into account randomly imposed burdens.
In Michelman’s scheme, demoralization costs arise directly from
noncompensation for government-imposed burdens and are a combination
of the nonfinancial “disutility” an individual suffers when the government
takes something of value that belongs to him and provides him with no
compensation141 and the loss of production that results from the lack of
compensation, caused by “demoralization of uncompensated losers, their
sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they
themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other
occasion.”142 Michelman suggests that demoralization costs (i.e., the costs
of uncompensated government-imposed burdens) may be particularly high
when first, very few people bear the burden for which compensation is
139

Questions to be studied might include how taxpayers currently view random audits; how being
compensated for costs imposed by random audits would affect taxpayers’ views of these audits; and
how education about random audits might affect taxpayers’ perceptions of these issues.
140
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis Without Analyzing Costs or Benefits:
Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1895, 1903–04
(2007) (using the term “casual empiricism” to describe Judge Posner’s decision-making in a particular
case that involved weighing costs and benefits and stating that “[a] standard difficulty with cost-benefit
analysis is that it may neglect costs and benefits that are not easily measured”); see also Matthew D.
Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 977, 977 (2004) (“[Agencies] almost never enumerate and price the distressing mental states . . .
that are causally connected to environmental, occupational, and consumer hazards.”). It may be
possible to quantify emotions such as fear and incorporate these quantifications into cost-benefit
analysis, but such quantification is rarely carried out. Id.
141
Michelman defines it as “the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers
and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation is offered.” Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).
142
Id. Michelman limits this to “the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production
(reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated
losers, their sympathizers, and other observers.” Id.
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sought; second, the costs of compensation, including both the amount of
compensation and the costs of administering the compensation, are low;
third, the costs imposed do not appear to be required by efficiency; and,
fourth, when different individuals bear the cost than reap the benefits.143
Michelman argues that demoralization costs arise in the context of
takings because people do not want to be subject to “majoritarian
exploitation”—that is, they do not want to be “at the mercy of
majorities.”144 Once strategy comes into play, an individual might be
systematically exploited. There is no comparable urgency for at least two
reasons, he argues, when it comes to compensating an individual for
random burdens. First, an individual may seek insurance against randomly
imposed burdens, but more importantly, there is no attendant loss of
morale when it comes to random burdens. Second, an individual is not
“uneasy” about such burdens because he simply has no control over them.
In contrast, individuals who are purposely selected by the government
because of specific characteristics bear heavy demoralization costs.
Burdens imposed by the government on random individuals are in
some sense purposive145—that is, the government, presumably enacting the
will of the majority, has made the specific decision to impose costs. But
the identity of the individuals who will bear these costs is not purposive.
The possibility of a given individual’s loss is not determined by strategy—
indeed, randomness is valuable precisely because of this lack of strategy.
Nonetheless, pace Michelman, it seems likely that demoralization costs
attend randomly imposed burdens, in the sense that being selected
randomly to bear a burden and not receiving any compensation may itself
impose a cost on an individual and may cause his sympathizers, or those
who hear of his situation, to act in ways that reduce social welfare overall.
For example, as discussed above, in the absence of random audit
compensation, people may be less likely to comply with the tax law if they
feel strongly that it is unfair to audit people at random and not compensate
them for the costs they incur.
At least five factors may create or increase demoralization costs in the
context of random burdens. Four of the factors are the same as those
related to Michelman’s demoralization costs as he defined them in the
context of takings: demoralization costs related to random burdens may be
higher (1) if very few people bear the burden for which compensation is
sought; (2) when the costs of compensation are low; (3) when the costs
imposed appear unnecessary; and (4) when the benefits of the burdens
accrue to people other than those who bear the burdens. 146 Additionally,
143

Id.
Id. at 1165, 1216–17.
145
Id. at 1217.
146
Id. at 1214.
144
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demoralization costs related to random burdens may be higher if the
underlying government function is unpopular.147 For example, an
individual may be unconcerned if he is not compensated for costs he bears
as a result of being randomly selected at an airport search intended to
prevent terrorism, as he may feel that preventing terrorism is generally a
function he wants the government to perform.
The concept of demoralization costs in the context of random burdens,
and the five factors that may increase such demoralization costs, can help
provide a general sense of how much the unfairness of random,
uncompensated audit costs decreases overall utility. The next Part uses
these five factors to incorporate unfairness into a rough model of costs and
benefits related to government compensation for various randomly
imposed burdens, including random audits.
V. WHEN DOES COMPENSATION MAKE SENSE IN THE REAL WORLD?
Actual fairness does not require compensation for most randomlyimposed audit costs. However, a welfarist analysis suggests that perceived
fairness should be incorporated into the mix of costs and benefits that
accrue when an individual is randomly selected by the government to bear
costs for the good of society as a whole. In particular, whether the tax law
is perceived as fair should matter to someone committed to an efficiency
analysis of tax compliance, for empirical work shows that individuals
prefer to comply with laws that they perceive as fair.
Although, as discussed above, firm empirical evidence about the costs
of random audits, financial, emotional, and otherwise, would be ideal when
creating a welfarist model to determine whether perceived fairness requires
compensation for random audits, this type of information is, and may
remain, unavailable. 148 In the meantime, proposals for audit compensation
continue. So, notwithstanding the absence of precise monetization of costs
and benefits, this Part suggests an answer to the compensation question by
comparing the burden of random audit costs with three other kinds of
government-imposed random burdens: checkpoint searches, jury service,
and military service. For each type of burden, this Part first explains why
the burden is imposed randomly, then reviews the direct financial costs,
opportunity costs, emotional costs, and demoralization costs that attend
being randomly selected to bear the particular burden. It examines the
benefits, if any, of being selected (including compensation), and finally
discusses whether insurance is available for the randomly imposed costs.
This Part concludes by arguing that some nominal amount of random audit
147

Michelman’s article does not reach this point because it addresses only one kind of
government-imposed cost: takings under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1165.
148
See supra Part IV.D.
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compensation may be useful to mitigate concerns about perceived
unfairness. Compensation might not be the only way to mitigate these
concerns, however, because the costs associated with perceived unfairness
may be greater because of the public’s overall lack of understanding of
random audits and negative view of the IRS. Thus, education about the
goals of random audits and about the IRS might complement, or even
replace, compensation as an effective way of reducing the fairness-related
costs of uncompensated random audits.
A. Checkpoint Searches
1. Randomness
There are many ways to determine who will be the subject of a
checkpoint search, but, in general, searches and seizures are deemed fairer
if the individual examined was not selected because of a personal
characteristic. For example, the Second Circuit has upheld random subway
searches as constitutional under the Fourth Amendment in part because
“police exercise no discretion in selecting whom to search, but rather
employ a formula that ensures they do not arbitrarily exercise their
authority.”149 The court took care to state in the first sentence of the
opinion that the searches were “random,” and noted in the facts section of
the opinion that the police officers
exercise virtually no discretion in determining whom to
search. The supervising sergeant establishes a selection rate,
such as every fifth or tenth person, based upon considerations
such as the number of officers and the passenger volume at
that particular checkpoint.
The officers then search
individuals in accordance with the established rate only.150
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of stopping cars
at a checkpoint near a military base in part because cars were stopped
randomly:
That the checkpoint stopped every sixth vehicle, rather than
every single vehicle, counters any suggestion of subjective
intrusion because it might dispel any concern of a lawabiding motorist that she had been singled out. There is no
evidence that [the defendant] was singled out or treated
arbitrarily or that the officers were operating with unfettered
149

MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 263, 273 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 265. As discussed supra Part II.A, in the context of audits, randomness may have other,
practical, advantages as a law enforcement mechanism—for example, it may increase the deterrent
effect of searches, see, e.g., MacWade, 460 F.3d at 274; United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 618
(9th Cir. 2005) (upholding random searches of airline passengers)—but I am interested here only in
whether it increases fairness.
150
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The court suggests, at least in this limited situation, that randomness makes
the imposition of these costs more acceptable and more fair. But it is also
true that some individuals bear the costs of searches, and some do not.
2. Costs
Checkpoint searches impose essentially no direct financial costs. They
impose a relatively small time cost—the subject of the search does have to
give up fifteen or twenty minutes of his time, but the opportunity cost of
such a brief period of time will generally be low. The emotional cost of
searches likely varies widely, depending on the individual searched. For
some, being stopped might be a mere nuisance; for others, having their car
searched by a police officer may verge on the traumatic.
Finally, demoralization costs in this context are likely to be low. The
only factor that might suggest higher demoralization costs is that the costs
of compensation, including administrative costs, would be low. In
contrast, four of the five demoralization factors suggest that random
searches do not impose significant demoralization costs. Many, if not
most, people have been stopped at some sort of checkpoint. The costs
imposed appear necessary; everyone understands how these searches
prevent crimes. The benefits of the burdens—less crime—accrue to
everyone, including those who are stopped. It seems likely that very few
people support crime, terrorism, or drunk driving, and most people
probably think that preventing these is an acceptable, even valuable, role
for the government to play.
3. Benefits and Compensation
There are essentially no benefits to a particular individual if he, instead
of someone else, is selected to be searched. That is, while an individual
may benefit if checkpoint searches reduce crime, and while a police
presence in a particular area may (or may not) provide an individual with a
sense of security, it does not benefit that individual in particular to be the
subject of a checkpoint search. Nonetheless, although the costs to an
individual of being the subject of a checkpoint search likely outweigh the
benefits to him, federal, state, and local governments generally do not
provide monetary compensation to individuals who are randomly selected
for checkpoint searches.
4. Insurance
No insurance is available specifically for costs imposed by checkpoint
searches, presumably because the costs are so low and the chances of being
151

United States v. Green, 293 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2002).

2008]

FAIRLY RANDOM

199

stopped so small that nobody would pay for such insurance. It might also
be argued that because the only type of significant cost related to
checkpoint stops would be emotional costs, health insurance that pays for
psychiatric care or counseling obviates any need for checkpoint-specific
insurance.
B. Jury Service
1. Randomness
An individual’s jury service is in part randomly determined
because the pool of individuals from which a jury is chosen is randomly
selected, and this randomness is generally thought to increase fairness. For
example, members of about twenty professions, including attorneys and
undertakers, used to be automatically excused from jury service in New
York State courts. Presumably professions were added to the exemption
list through some combination of special pleading, inside connections, and
a belief that members of these professions were too valuable in their dayto-day jobs to be wasted on jury duty. But Chief Judge Judith Kaye
repealed many automatic exemptions, in part, she explained, “to spread the
burdens and benefits of jury duty more equitably.”152 Again, increasing
randomness and reducing individualized treatment increased fairness ex
ante. 153
2. Costs
The direct financial costs of serving on a jury are minimal, and may
include the cost of transportation to the courthouse, parking, and perhaps a
meal or two (assuming one would otherwise not be paying for any of these
items). The opportunity costs differ depending on what type of job the
potential juror holds and where the juror lives. Individuals cannot be fired
for taking time off work to serve on a jury.154 People who earn salaries,
and not hourly wages, generally do not lose any pay for serving on a jury,
and are not required to use vacation time for jury service, although they
may suffer other opportunity costs, such as inability to attend an important
152

David Rohde, Jury Duty Loses Some Sting in Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1998, at B1,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
153
Justice Marshall argued that fairness required that peremptory challenges be eliminated, which
would have increased the randomness of jury selection, but his concern appeared to be with the rights
of defendants, not with the costs imposed on jurors. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that peremptory challenges have been used to exclude blacks from
juries).
154
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1875(a) (2006) (“No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge,
intimidate, or coerce any permanent employee by reason of such employee’s jury service, or the
attendance or scheduled attendance in connection with such service, in any court of the United
States.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-173(a) (2006) (“No employer shall discharge or threaten to discharge
any permanent employee by reason of such employee’s jury service, or the attendance or scheduled
attendance in connection with such service, in any court of Kansas.”).
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meeting. On the other hand, people who earn hourly wages are generally
not paid for the days they spend on jury service. 155
The emotional costs of jury service vary. There are not necessarily
emotional costs to serving on a jury, although the experience may, like any
experience, be unpleasant. How unpleasant jury service will be might
depend on the nature of the case (e.g., whether the juror has to view
unpleasant evidence), the length of the case, whether the jury is
sequestered, whether the other jurors are difficult individuals, and so forth.
Uncompensated jury service might create moderate demoralization
costs. Many people are selected for jury service at some point.156 Because
jury service in this country is by definition imposed upon citizens in
general, the cost of serving on a jury cannot be avoided if the system is to
exist. The benefits of jury service may accrue to the jurors themselves. As
discussed below, 157 there may be benefits to jurors from serving on a
particular jury, and the existence of a jury system may help those jurors
later, if they or someone they are close to is accused of a crime. Finally,
most people support the idea of a jury system. 158 However, the cost of
compensation for jury service, including administrative costs, would likely
be low, and the costs of service here are non-negligible, as opposed to the
costs of being stopped at a checkpoint, which might tend to increase
demoralization costs.
3. Benefits and Compensation
There may also be benefits to serving on a jury. The experience itself
may be interesting, or exciting, or the juror may learn something about the
American system of justice. 159 A juror in a particularly prominent case
might gain a certain amount of notoriety, if he so desires.160 And some
people may take pleasure in exercising a political right that is partially

155
See, e.g., Jake Levy-Pollans, If Crime Doesn’t Pay, Neither Does Jury Duty, MINNPOST.COM,
July 23, 2008, available at http://www.minnpost.com/community_voices/2008/07/23/2661/if_crime_
doesnt_pay_neither_does_jury_duty.
156
Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury COLA: Fulfilling the Duty To Compensate Jurors
Adequately, 5 N.Y.U.L. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 291 n.2 (2002) (stating that various studies show
that between sixteen and twenty-nine percent of Americans servce as jurors at some point).
157
See infra text accompanying notes 159–62.
158
According to a 2004 Harris Interactive poll, seventy-five percent of Americans would want
their case to be decided by a jury, rather than a judge, and eighty-four percent of Americans think jury
duty is an “important civic duty that should be fulfilled.” AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, J URY
SERVICE: IS FULFILLING YOUR CIVIC D UTY A TRIAL?, (July 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/
media/releases/juryreport.pdf.
159
See, e.g., D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY 13 (2002).
160
E.g., MICHAEL KNOX & MIKE WALKER, THE PRIVATE D IARY OF AN O.J. JUROR ix (1995);
Denis Collins, My 15 Minutes, All Because of Scooter, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2007, at B1, available at
LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File (“When I finished talking to the media that first morning after our
verdict [finding I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby guilty of perjury], I knew that would not be the end of the
story . . . . Let’s be honest, I was ready to be seduced [by the media].”).

2008]

FAIRLY RANDOM

201
161

constitutive of what it means to be a citizen, a right that was either de
facto or de jure denied to many people in this country for many years.162
In addition to these more abstract benefits, jurors are generally
compensated for their service. All states and the federal government
provide some token payment to jurors, ranging from ten dollars a day to
fifty dollars a day. Over half the states and the federal government also
reimburse jurors for certain travel expenses.163 These amounts probably
cover baseline out-of-pocket costs, though they may not cover jurors’
actual out-of-pocket costs, for at least three reasons. First, no state
compensates jurors based on what the jurors actually spend, though some
states require receipts in order to obtain the baseline amount for parking
expenses, for example. If a juror decided to go out to a very expensive
lunch on the day of his jury service, perhaps because the courthouse was
close to a fancy restaurant, he would not be able to turn in his receipt and
have the state pay him for that lunch. Second, no state attempts to
compensate at a flat rate based on the highest amount a juror could spend
on basic needs such as meals or transportation, even though jurors may be
accustomed to having very expensive lunches, or may drive cars that get
very low gas mileage. 164 Finally, the flat daily compensation is not enough
161
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 216-18 & 217 n.*, 258-66 & 260 n.*
(1998); Vikram D. Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
203, 239 (1995) (explaining that jury service is as much a part of the “package” of political rights as is
voting); see also Sarah B. Lawsky, Note, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against
Women Act, 109 YALE L.J. 783, 788 & n.29 (2000) (indicating that political rights include the right to
serve on a jury).
162
U.S. Supreme Court cases attempting to eliminate such discrimination provide both
descriptions of the discrimination and a timeline of when such discrimination was finally struck down
as unconstitutional. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that
peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude jurors based solely on their gender); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (holding that peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude
jurors based solely on their race); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975) (striking down as
unconstitutional a statute excluding women from juries); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312
(1880) (striking down as unconstitutional a law excluding blacks from juries).
163
28 U.S.C. § 1871 (2006) (stating that federal jurors are to be compensated forty dollars a day,
but may, at the discretion of the judge, be paid an additional ten dollars a day for each day of the trial in
excess of thirty days, in the case of a petit juror, or each day of service in excess of forty-five days, for
a grand juror, and providing for travel and parking expenses); GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., THE STATE OF -THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS 11–12 (2007) (discussing state juror
compensation). A 2007 study found that flat rates set at the state level ranged from $10 a day
(Alabama) to $41.20 a day (New Mexico). Other states employ a graduated rate, and pay nothing or
very little for the first several days, but pay a higher rate beginning on a later day of service. For
example, Connecticut pays a juror nothing for his first five days of service, but beginning on the sixth
day he receives $50 a day. Other states, such as Montana, pay sworn jurors only. Finally, some states
set a state minimum compensation but permit counties to supplement that rate. For example, Georgia
mandates a state minimum rate of $5, but the average rate is around $24, because counties choose to
supplement the state base rate. Id.
164
The median reimbursement in 2007 was $0.325 per mile. MIZE ET AL., supra note 163, at 11.
The average price of a gallon of gas in June 2007 was about $3.06. Energy Information
Administration, U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/
dnav/pet/pet_pri_gnd_a_epmr_pte_cpgal_m.htm (last visited July 6, 2008). Someone who chose to
drive, say, a Lamborghini to jury service (a Lamborghini gets about eight miles to a gallon in city
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to cover other out-of-pocket costs, such as daycare, that may be
unavoidable for some jurors.165 While the basic flat rate may cover out-ofpocket costs, it is not enough to cover opportunity costs such as lost
wages.166 Generally, employers are not required to pay employees for days
missed due to jury service. Similarly, jury compensation payments do not
take into account emotional costs.
4. Insurance
There is no separate market for jury insurance, that is, insurance an
individual might buy separately to cover his costs in case he is called for
jury service. It is not clear whether this is due to a lack of desire for jury
insurance, or some type of market failure. It may be a combination of
both, because jury insurance is built into some jobs. Salaried workers are
not docked pay or vacation days for attending jury service, and some union
contracts for hourly workers include jury pay provisions.167 Thus, some
employers provide opportunity-cost jury insurance just as they fully or
partially sponsor other types of insurance for their employers. But some
individuals who are paid by the hour and do not belong to a union, or
belong to a union that is not particularly powerful, do not have access to
jury insurance.
C. Military Service
1. Randomness
As with jury service, whether an individual serves in the military has at
times been determined randomly, at least in part, as the pool of individuals
who will be further investigated individually for their fitness to serve in the
military has in the past been randomly selected. Indeed, in response to
objections that the draft unfairly favored the wealthy, Congress amended
the law so that individuals had fewer opportunities to plead special
driving) would thus not be fully compensated for his fuel costs. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 2008 Most and
Least Fuel Efficient Vehicles, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/best/bestworstNF.shtml (last visited
July 6, 2008).
165
A juror may be excused if her jury service would cause too much of a hardship for her, but
generally she must go to the courthouse for at least one day in order to be excused. See, e.g., U.S.
Courts, Juror Qualifications: Exemptions and Excuses, http://www.uscourts.gov/jury/qualifications.
html (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
166
An individual working full time and earning minimum wage makes at least forty dollars a day,
before taxes (if any). See 29 U.S.C. § 206, as amended by the U.S. Troops Readiness, Veterans’ Care,
Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, Pub L. No. 110-28, § 8102 (stating that
federal minimum wage was raised to $5.85 as of July 24, 2007). There is one notable exception:
Arizona has a “Lengthy Trial Fund” which it uses to compensate jurors up to $300 per day for lost
wages, retroactive to the fourth day of trial, if the trial lasts at least six days. MIZE ET AL., supra note
163, at 12.
167
See, e.g., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REEDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT D ISTRICT AND THE REEDY
CREEK FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION IAFF LOCAL 2117 43 (2004), available at http://www.reedycreek.
org/pdf/2004-2006_contract.pdf.
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circumstances and escape conscription. For example, before the law was
amended, students could defer service by showing that they were in school
full time and making “satisfactory progress toward a degree.”169 Under
current law, if the draft is enacted, a college student could postpone service
only until the end of the current semester (or, in the case of a senior, until
the end of the current academic year).170 In other words, to increase
fairness, Congress increased randomness.
2. Costs
Serving in the military imposes significant costs. It imposes
essentially no direct financial costs, as individuals do not pay out of pocket
to join the military. The opportunity costs, though, range from the
substantial to the infinite. At the very least, an individual who is inducted
into the military will lose the years he could have spent doing another job
and the money he could have earned from that job. At the other extreme,
an individual who is drafted could be killed while serving. Serving in the
military also increases one’s chances of becoming severely disabled,
thereby reducing one’s lifetime earning power. Emotional costs of serving
in the military may also be substantial.
Demoralization costs in this context would likely vary widely. A
military draft could be widespread, or it could be relatively narrow,
depending on how many men were needed for service. The costs of
compensation for military service are always high because the costs to an
individual of military service are high. The conflict in which the
government is involved, and thus the need for military service, might seem
reasonable (for example, most people eventually agreed that the United
States should be involved in World War II), or it might seem unreasonable
or unnecessary (for example, opinion is split on whether the United States
should have invaded Iraq). Some people serving in the military will
benefit from that service, but others might not, and some conflicts may
seem to serve only the interests of a select group of citizens, as opposed to
benefiting all citizens. And while some people support all applications of
the underlying governmental function of raising a military, others might be
pacifists, opposed to the military in general, or opposed to the specific
conflict for which the draft was instituted.
3. Benefits and Compensation
On the other hand, serving in the military can be highly beneficial.
168
See Selective Serv. Sys., How the Draft Has Changed Since Vietnam,
http://www.sss.gov/viet.htm (last visited July 8, 2008) (“A series of reforms during the latter part of the
Vietnam conflict changed the way the draft operated to make it more fair and equitable. If a draft were
held today, there would be fewer reasons to excuse a man from service.”).
169
Id.
170
Id.
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Setting aside any government compensation for service, the actual service
itself may provide an individual with structure or training he might not
have obtained otherwise, and military service can be a full and rewarding
career. As with serving on a jury, an individual may appreciate exercising
a political right that is partially constitutive of what it means to be a
citizen. 171
The government provides substantial compensation for serving in the
military in addition to these other benefits. Active duty military receive a
salary, low-cost housing, medical care for themselves and their families,
and many other benefits.172 Veterans may receive pensions, tuition
assistance, and medical care.173 Disabled veterans receive military
disability payments.174 The tax code provides incentives for private
employers to hire certain veterans, which means the government
essentially subsidizes part of some veterans’ private-sector salaries. 175
Federal and state governments give veterans preferences for certain jobs in
order to compensate the veterans for “economic loss” they suffered due to
their service. 176
171

See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Benefits for Service Members, http://www.defenselink.mil/militarypay/benefits/
militaryben.pdf (last visited July 8, 2008).
173
See, e.g., Gerald A. Williams, A Primer on Veterans’ Benefits for Legal Assistance Attorneys,
47 A.F.L. REV. 163, 163 (1999); U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, A SUMMARY OF VA BENEFITS
(2004), available at http://www.vba.va.gov/VBA/benefits/factsheets/general/21-00-1.pdf.
174
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 173, at 163; U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, D ISABILITY
COMPENSATION BENEFITS (2007), available at http://www1.va.gov/opa/vadocs/fedben.pdf.
175
I.R.C. § 51 provides a tax credit to businesses equal to forty percent of a “qualified veteran’s”
first-year wages, up to $12,000 a year. In other words, the federal government pays up to $4800 of a
“qualified veteran’s” first-year wages. A qualified veteran for these purposes is a veteran who is a
member of a family that has received food stamps for at least three months in the year prior to the
veteran’s hiring, or is entitled to compensation for a service-connected disability and either is hired no
more than one year after discharge from active duty, or has been unemployed for an aggregate of at
least six months in the year prior to hiring. I.R.C. § 51(d)(2)(A). Employers get work opportunity
credits for other types of employees as well (for example, certain ex-felons or food stamp recipients),
but the amount of wages with respect to each individual that may be taken into account for the credit is
only $6000, as opposed to $12,000 for qualified veterans. I.R.C. § 51(b)(3).
176
See, e.g., U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., VetsInfo Guide: Civil Service Employment and
Veterans, http://www.opm.gov/veterans/html/vetsinfo.asp (last visited July 10, 2008) (“Since the time
of the Civil War, veterans of the Armed Forces have been given some degree of preference in
appointments to Federal jobs. Recognizing their sacrifice, Congress enacted laws to prevent veterans
seeking Federal employment from being penalized for their time in military service. Veterans’
preference recognizes the economic loss suffered by citizens who have served their country in uniform,
restores veterans to a favorable competitive position for Government employment, and acknowledges
the larger obligation owed to disabled veterans. Veterans’ preference is not so much a reward for being
in uniform as it is a way to help make up for the economic loss suffered by those who answered the
nation’s call to arms.”); Kansas Civil Serv. Jobs, Veterans Preference, http://da.ks.gov/
ps/aaa/recruitment/veterans.htm (last visited July 10, 2008) (“In recognition of the sacrifices made by
those serving in the Armed Forces, the State of Kansas enacted laws to prevent veterans seeking State
employment from being penalized because of time spent in military service. Veterans’ preference
recognizes the economic loss suffered by citizens who have served their country in uniform, restores
veterans to a favorable competitive position for Government employment. Veterans’ preference is not
so much as a reward for being in uniform as it is a way to help make up for the economic loss suffered
by those who answered the nation’s call to arms.”); Military.com Benefits, New York State Veteran’s
172
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However, if an individual is drafted, he clearly feels, at least before he
experiences military service, that the monetary compensation together with
other benefits offered by the military do not outweigh the expected costs of
service for him. If he did feel that the benefits of his service outweighed
his expected costs, presumably he would have willingly signed up for
military duty, instead of being drafted. In other words, while the
government does provide considerable compensation for military service,
drafted individuals likely do not receive full compensation for their
service. 177
4. Insurance
Notwithstanding that those drafted may not feel fully compensated for
their military service, no opportunity cost insurance has traditionally been
available for those who might be drafted. The military does offer low-cost
life insurance for the families of service members, but no insurance is, or
has been, available to provide cash compensation for opportunity costs to
service members who survive military service. Again, it is not clear
whether this reflects a lack of desire for such insurance, given the
substantial benefits ostensibly provided veterans, or some type of market
failure.

Benefits, http://www.military.com/benefits/veteran-benefits/new-york-state-veterans-benefits (last
visited July 10, 2008) (stating that with regard to state and local civil service jobs, there would be a
“[t]en-point additional credit preference toward original appointment for disabled wartime veterans;
five-points for wartime service; and two and a half points for competitive promotional exams. Job
retention rights applicable to veterans and spouses of totally disabled veterans”); see also Pers. Adm’r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 261, 265 (1979) (stating that “[t]he Federal Government and
virtually all of the States grant some sort of hiring preference to veterans” in order to “reward veterans
for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the transition from military to civilian life, [and] to
encourage patriotic service”).
177
This may be, at least in part, because the benefits that the government ostensibly provides may
be less than they initially seem. For example, veterans benefits may be difficult to obtain, and health
care provided both to veterans and to active-duty military may be severely lacking. See generally
Traumatic Brain Injury Access to Options Act, S. 1113, 110th Cong. (2007) (requiring that members of
the Armed Forces who incur traumatic brain injury while on active duty be retained on active duty in
the Armed Forces for one year after the medical assessment of their ability to perform certain activities,
in order to prevent transfer to the VA system); William F. Fox, Jr., Deconstructing and Reconstructing
the Veterans Benefits System, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 339 (describing problems with the veterans
benefits system); INDEP. REVIEW GROUP, REBUILDING THE TRUST: REPORT ON REHABILITATIVE CARE
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES AT WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER AND NATIONAL NAVAL
MEDICAL CENTER (2007), available at http://www.npr.org/documents/2007/apr/walter_reed/executive.
pdf (finding extensive failures in health care for both active-duty military and veterans); Press Release,
Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Bayh, Clinton Call on Secretaries Gates and Nicholson to Immediately
Address Care for Troops with Traumatic Brain Injury (July 10, 2008), available at
http://clinton.senate.gov/news/statements/details.cfm?id=272376&& (“Most problems with care have
occurred when soldiers suffering from TBI [traumatic brain injury] have been transferred from active
duty status to medically retired, where they can no longer access private care centers and must receive
treatment through the VA, which currently lacks comprehensive treatment for TBI patients.”).
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D. Random Audits: A Comparison
1. Costs
As discussed above, 178 a taxpayer may incur direct financial costs if he
is selected as the subject of a random audit, including paying an accountant
or attorney to represent him. Random audits may also create opportunity
costs. If a taxpayer hires someone to represent him, the audit should take
only a moderate amount of his time, perhaps time spent gathering receipts
and documentation, meeting with his representative two or three times, and
meeting once with the auditor. These opportunity costs should be more
than the opportunity costs, if any, of a checkpoint stop; somewhat less than
the opportunity costs of an average jury trial; and far less than the
opportunity costs of compelled military service.
The emotional costs of audits may be high. Random audits as
currently conceived are fairly invasive. As discussed above, most
individuals selected for the current round of random audits will meet in
person with IRS auditors to confirm specific lines of their returns, which
will probably involve reviewing many of the taxpayer’s financial
documents and questioning the taxpayer about specific expenditures to
determine, for example, whether the taxpayer’s deductions really were for
business expenses. This seems more like a physical search of one’s house,
and less like a police officer patting an individual’s bag in a public place or
waving a magnetometer over an individual, but again, far less than the
possible emotional costs of military service.
Demoralization costs of random audits may be high. Unlike the many
who are selected for jury service or checkpoint stops, very few people are
selected for random audits, and so those selected may feel particularly
disfavored. Depending on whether people understand random audits and
DIF scores (and it seems likely that people understand very little about
either of these), the costs imposed by random audits appear unnecessary.
Furthermore, it is not clear what benefits are created by these audits at all,
much less whether any benefits accrue to the subject of the audit. And
while people may support the government’s preventing crime or stopping
drunk drivers, and may like that the United States has a jury system, many
people hate paying taxes and the tax system. 179

178

See supra Part II.B.
Most people either “dislike” or “hate” doing their income taxes (66%, according to an April
2001 Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll; 70%, according to a March-April 2005 Harris Interactive/Tax
Foundation poll). In 1983, 51% of taxpayers viewed the IRS favorably; in 2001, 46% did. The IRS
was the lowest-ranked of twenty federal agencies. The next lowest were the CIA and the Bureau of
Land Management, each with 49% favorable. For comparison, the National Park Service had an 80%
favorable rating; the FBI, 59%; and the Postal Service, 78%. AEI STUDIES IN PUBLIC OPINION, PUBLIC
OPINION ON TAXES 1 (2008), available at http://www.aei.org/publicopinion6.
179
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2. Benefits and Compensation
Paying taxes, like jury service and military service, may also be an
element of citizenship and a civic responsibility.180 One version of civic
republicanism argues that while no citizen should be denied the right to
serve on a jury, or serve in the military, neither should a citizen be able to
choose not to live up to the responsibility of citizenship by refusing to
serve on a jury or refusing to serve in the military.181 An effective tax
system requires some type of enforcement, so bearing audit costs that
permit a tax system to keep working may also be a civic responsibility—
one best spread by selecting individuals at random to bear these costs.182
Audits are unlike military service and jury duty, though, and more like
a checkpoint search in that an individual taxpayer is unlikely to gain any
benefit from an audit, whereas it is possible that an individual might come
to appreciate serving, or having served, in the military or on a jury. 183 In
part this is because the actual experience of an audit is inherently less of a
learning experience than either military or jury service, especially if a
taxpayer hires someone to handle the audit for him, something that is
currently impossible to do with military or jury service. 184
180
See, e.g., O’Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 278–79, 282 (1939) (upholding as
constitutional a law taxing the income of federal judges, the Court noted: “To subject [judges] to a
general tax is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular function in
government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden
of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering.”); BRUCE ALLEN
MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 183 (2003) (quoting Justice
Douglas as saying, regarding his vote in O’Malley v. Woodrough to make Justices’ salaries taxable,
“As I made the little entry into the docket sheet I said to myself, ‘Young man, you’ve just voted
yourself first-class citizenship.’ I decided that, if we were going to pay taxes like everybody else, that
you should be a citizen like everybody else, except that unless the thing you are doing interferes with
the work on the Court.”); Guttman, supra note 1 (stating that Lawrence Gibbs, the only former IRS
commissioner known to have been the subject of a TCMP (random) audit, views TCMP audits as “part
of a taxpayer’s obligation as a citizen, similar to the draft”); Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income
Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 468 (2000) (arguing that “one of [the responsibilities of
citizenship] is the obligation to participate in the funding of public goods by paying an appropriate
share of their cost”); Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic Virtues of a
Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53, 60 (2007) (arguing that paying taxes and voting
are “the two great responsibilities of citizenship”).
181
See supra note 161.
182
Unlike military service or jury duty, there is no further individual investigation to determine
whether an individual will actually be audited, but this makes sense, because some people will make
better soldiers, or better jurors, than others, whereas everyone is equally suited to be randomly audited
by the IRS. See, e.g., NEIL D UXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE 156 (1999) (“A basic problem with selecting
conscripts by way of a draft lottery is that some of the most able and willing soldiers will not be
picked.”).
183
But see Guttman, supra note 1 (stating that Lawrence Gibbs, the only former IRS
commissioner known to have been the subject of a TCMP random audit, felt that “his TCMP audit
taught him how to better organize his records”); cf. Zelenak, supra note 180, at 60 (arguing that tax
compliance is a civic virtue, and that paying taxes is “an important civic activity [that] demands a
ceremony, and the filing of one’s tax return is that ceremony”).
184
During the Civil War, men who were drafted into the Union Army could pay the government a
$300 “commutation” that would exempt them from service. Michael S. Satow, Consientous Objectors:
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The government compensates individuals for military service and jury
duty. Compensation for random audits would be more on the scale of jury
duty compensation, as opposed to the massive benefits ostensibly provided
to service members and veterans. Individuals do not receive full
compensation for their jury service, however. Full compensation for
random audits could be extremely expensive if the government attempted
to compensate individuals for all costs of random audits, including actual
out-of-pocket costs, opportunity costs, and perhaps even emotional costs.
Reimbursing taxpayers for their actual expenditures, as opposed to flat-rate
compensation, would also create large administrative costs.185
****

Their Status, the Law, and Its Development, GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 113, 115 (1992). The
World War I draft included no such exception. Id. at 117.
185
For example, the NRP that began in 2007 will examine approximately 13,000 returns a year.
See supra note 28. As discussed supra note 41, a taxpayer’s out-of-pocket costs alone could range as
high as $25,000 per audit. This suggests that the total cost of the compensation program could be
several hundred million dollars, including administrative costs.
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The following chart summarizes the discussion so far:
Checkpoints

Jury

Military

Audit

None

Small

None

Medium

None

Medium

Large

Medium
Small

Varies
Small

Large
Varies

Small/
Medium
Medium
Medium/
Large

To Others
Demoralization

Small

Medium

Varies

Medium/
Large

Benefits (except
compensation)
To Individual
To Others (as a group)
Compensation

Small
Large
None

Medium
Large
Small
(baseline
out-ofpocket)

Large
Large
Large

Small
Large
None
(currently)

Costs
To Individual
Direct financial (out-ofpocket)
Indirect financial
(opportunity)
Emotional
Demoralization

These are, of course, merely comparative, order-of-magnitude
estimates. Depending on a person’s job, for example, a long jury trial
could present significant opportunity costs, or none at all (if the person is
retired).
Emotional costs of course would vary widely among
individuals—a checkpoint stop could present no emotional cost to one
person and be nearly traumatic to another. Moreover, it is unclear how one
would compare, say, “medium” emotional costs with “medium” direct
financial costs, because it is not clear how (if at all) one could monetize
emotional costs.186 Finally, even if it were possible to get a correct
estimate for each type of cost, and to monetize emotional and
demoralization costs, the result for the appropriate amount of
compensation would still depend on the utility curve and social welfare
function selected.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the comparison between random
audit costs and other randomly imposed burdens suggests that perceived
unfairness created by random audits should be mitigated by some
compensation, but not by full compensation, where full compensation
would include compensation for actual out-of-pocket expenditures, all
opportunity costs, and all emotional costs. If demoralization costs can be
eliminated or reduced by nominal compensation, some amount of
compensation for random audits might be particularly desirable. This is
186

Article.

This is an extremely complex issue within welfarism, and is far beyond the scope of this
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especially true if demoralization costs stemming from the perception of
unfairness in fact result in lower compliance by taxpayers in general, as
opposed to the targeted taxpayer.
Compensation might not be the only way to reduce demoralization
costs in the tax context, though; education may help as much or more.
Factors that seem to increase the demoralization costs of random audits
include taxpayers’ belief that random audits are unnecessary, taxpayers’
belief that they obtain no benefit from random audits in particular or a
functioning tax system in general, and taxpayers’ general dislike of the tax
system. 187 If nominal compensation were accompanied by a campaign to
explain the purpose of random audits and the ways that taxpayers are
selected for audit, as well as a general campaign to popularize taxes, and
the Internal Revenue Service in particular, demoralization costs could be
reduced substantially. 188 But these issues are unrelated to randomness. As
the discussion of checkpoints, jury service, and military service suggests,
randomness need not be associated with unfairness, even when this
randomness comes in the form of the government’s selecting individuals at
random to bear costs for the benefit of society at large.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article examines one aspect of whether taxpayers who are
randomly selected for audit should, as some academics and politicians
have suggested, be compensated for their audit costs.189 An egalitarian
analysis of randomly imposing audit costs suggests that if the insurance
market is working properly, fairness does not require the government to
compensate individuals for these costs, because individuals are able to
purchase insurance if they choose, and are not required to participate in a
government insurance scheme. Fairness may, however, require the
government to compensate low-income taxpayers for whom the market for
audit insurance has failed.
Even though it is generally fair for the government not to compensate
taxpayers for randomly imposed audit costs, taxpayers may still perceive
this lack of compensation as unfair. This perceived unfairness should
matter to a welfarist, because people prefer to comply with laws, including
tax laws, that they perceive to be fair.
In particular, if randomly imposing audit costs on a few individuals for
the good of the whole is seen as unfair and thus creates demoralization
187

See supra text accompanying note 179.
This would not be unprecedented; the United States engaged in a massive and successful
propaganda campaign to popularize the income tax during World War II. See generally Carolyn C.
Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During
World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1988).
189
See supra notes 1, 36–39 and accompanying text.
188
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costs, compensating taxpayers for these randomly imposed audit costs may
reduce social costs and increase compliance. A comparison between
random audits and other random costs suggests that nominal compensation,
not full compensation, may be the best approach, and that education about
the tax system may complement this compensation to decrease
demoralization costs even further.
As discussed above, there may be reasons other than fairness, such as
calibrating marginal audit costs and benefits, to compensate taxpayers
randomly selected for audit.190 And, as this Article has argued, the
government might wish to mitigate perceived unfairness of random audit
costs by providing nominal compensation for these costs. But this
perceived unfairness is not due simply to randomness, and therefore
general appeals to fairness that equate random costs with unfair costs
should not be used to support such compensation.
****
By way of epilogue, let us return to Senator Paul Coverdell of
Georgia.191 Closer inspection suggests that Senator Coverdell’s objections
to putatively random audits may not have been objections to randomness at
all. He did not, after all, propose his anti-randomness legislation because
he objected to random audits in the abstract; he proposed that legislation
because his constituents had been targeted disproportionately—that is,
nonrandomly—due to specific IRS projects.192 As Coverdell stated before
Congress, “the IRS has been specifically targeting the State of Georgia for
random audits. Nearly twice as many random audits took place in Georgia
between 1994 and 1996 than in all the New England states combined and
Georgians are three-times more likely to be randomly audited than their
California counterparts.”193
In other words, although on one level there was too much randomness,
Coverdell’s complaint was actually triggered by too little randomness. In
1995, somewhat less than three percent of the total population of the
United States lived in Georgia, so even a relatively large truly random
audit of U.S. taxpayers would probably have involved only a very small

190

See supra Part II.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 34, 110.
192
IRS’ USE OF RANDOM SELECTION, supra note 12, at 2 (noting, in response to an inquiry from
Senator Coverdell, that the “IRS chose the subpopulations for the six projects nonrandomly on the basis
of known or suspected high noncompliance rates and other criteria, including geographic location or
business size . . . .Three of the six projects included taxpayers from Georgia”).
193
144 CONG. REC. S9212, S9235 (1998) (statement of Sen, Coverdell) (introducing the Internal
Revenue Service Random Audit Prohibition Act); see Senators Blast IRS, supra note 33 (stating, while
discussing random audits, that “you have three chances more of being audited in the State of Georgia
than many of the other States”).
191
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number of Georgians.
Thus, had these audits actually been random,
random audits may well have escaped Senator Coverdell’s scrutiny
altogether.

194
According to the Census Bureau, approximately 2.7% of U.S. residents lived in Georgia in
1995.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Counties 1996, Geographic Area: Georgia,
http://www.census.gov/statab/USA96/13/000.txt (stating that the population of Georgia in 1995 was
7,200,882) (last visited July 10, 2008); U.S. Census Bureau, Intercensal Estimates of the United States
Resident Population by Age and Sex: 1995, http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/
EST90INTERCENSAL/US-EST90INT-07/US-EST90INT-07-1995.csv (stating that the population of
the United States on January 1, 1995, was 264,753,646) (last visited July 10, 2008). This proportion
has increased—in 2006, it was about 3.1%. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quick Facts:
Georgia, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/13000.html (stating that as of 2006, there were an
estimated 9,363,941 people living in Georgia and an estimated 299,398,484 people in the United
States) (last visited July 10, 2008).

